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ABSTRACT
This Article argues that the current approach of the Department of
Health and Human Services and the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) to enforcement of the Ethics in Patient Referrals
Act (the “Stark Law”) is unnecessarily punitive and discourages
health-care providers from self-disclosing even very minor violations
of the Stark Law. This Article suggests a number of specific changes
to encourage provider self-disclosure and proposes that CMS create a
demonstration project under the authority of the Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act to test the reforms. A demonstration project provides the perfect vehicle to prove that increased self-disclosure protocols for the Stark Law can decrease the government’s costs of enforcement, improve program integrity, and encourage providers to
deal responsibly with the inevitable minor lapses in compliance that
arise in such an enormous government program as Medicare.
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INTRODUCTION
Benjamin Franklin, that astute observer of nature and humanity,
once described his approach to making difficult decisions in terms that
sound quite modern. He said that when he had a difficult decision to
make, “[t]o get over [any uncertainty] . . . my way is to divide half a
sheet of paper by a line into two columns; writing over the one Pro,
and the other Con. Then . . . I put down under the different heads
short hints of the different motives . . . for and against the measure . . .
.”1 Mr. Franklin further opined that other people using a similar approach are more likely to take a particular action once they see clearly
how they would benefit from taking the action. Before the complexity
of the formulas, graphs, and charts of modern cost-benefit analysis,
Franklin summed it up quite simply: “[A] spoonful of honey will
catch more flies than [a] [g]allon of [v]inegar.”2
This Article argues that the Department of Health and Human
Services (HHS) and its constituent agency, the Centers for Medicare
and Medicaid Services (CMS), are using vinegar instead of honey in
CMS’s current approach to enforcement of the Ethics in Patient Referrals Act of 1988, commonly referred to as the “Stark Law,” or simply
“Stark,” in honor of its author, Representative Pete Stark.3 The Stark
Law prohibits physicians from referring Medicare patients for certain
services to entities in which the physician has a financial interest, unless an exception applies.4 Stark is extremely detailed and does not
require the element of intent to trigger legal liability. As a result, it is
quite easy for health-care providers to unwittingly run afoul of the
law, leaving them liable to repay fees earned for patient care, in addition to civil penalties.
1
Letter from Benjamin Franklin to Joseph Priestley (Sept. 19, 1772) (emphasis in original) (on file with the Library of Congress).
2
RICHARD SAUNDERS, POOR RICHARD, AN ALMANACK (1744) (quoting Benjamin Franklin) (on file with Yale University Library).
3
Limitation on Certain Physician Referrals (Stark Law), 42 U.S.C. §
1395nn (2006). The Stark Law and supporting regulations have been modified significantly over the years to add or expand covered designated health services and
exceptions. This Article refers to the laws and regulations collectively as “Stark” or
“the Stark Law” unless otherwise noted.
4
Prohibition on Certain Referrals by Physicians (Stark Regulations), 42
C.F.R §§ 411.353-411.389 (2010). Some of the more commonly relied upon exceptions include those for services performed personally by or under the personal supervision of a physician in the same group practice as the referring physician; services
provided ancillary to the physician’s or group’s own professional services; personal
services arrangements meeting specific requirements; isolated transactions such as the
sale of a practice; and fair market value compensation documented in a specific manner prescribed by the regulations.
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The Affordable Care Act of 2010 (ACA)5 required CMS to develop a procedure by which health-care providers could self-disclose
violations of the Stark Law.6 The statute also explicitly gave CMS the
authority to reduce the financial penalties for Stark violations as a way
to encourage providers to self-disclose violations.7 Congress included
these provisions in the ACA in response to providers’ requests. Indeed, before the self-disclosure protocol was released, many healthcare providers were hopeful that CMS would create a protocol that
would provide relief from the draconian penalties that can result from
very minor infractions of the Stark Law. For example, the American
Hospital Association (AHA) wrote a letter to HHS Secretary Kathleen
Sebelius urging that HHS use the discretion given it under the ACA to
“offer providers a clear and understandable process for presenting and
resolving disclosed issues—a framework that is fair; adjusts repayments to the harm, if any, to patients and the program; takes [the] financial condition of the provider into account; and offers reasonable
certainty or predictability of outcomes.”8
In September 2010, CMS released its Self-Referral Disclosure
Protocol (SRDP), with a slightly revised version released on May 6,
2011.9 Unfortunately, the SRDP is so punitive and difficult to navigate that very few health-care providers have made disclosures, despite specific legal requirements to do so. As will be detailed in this
Article, the program takes a harder line, provides less guidance, and
offers fewer incentives to use the protocol than similar self-disclosure
protocols, such as those employed by HHS’s Office of Inspector General for the Anti-Kickback Statute and by New York State for its
Medicaid program.10

5
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111–148, 124
Stat. 119 (2010), amended by Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010,
Pub. L. No. 111–152, 123 Stat. 1029 (2010) (to be codified as amended at various
sections of Title 42 of the United States Code).
5
Id. § 6409 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn note).
6
Id.
7
See id.
8
Letter from Rick Pollack, Exec. Vice President, Am. Hosp. Ass’n, to Kathleen Sebelius, Sec’y, Dep’t of Health & Human Serv’s 3 (July 16, 2010) [hereinafter
AHA Letter], http://www.aha.org/aha/letter/2010/100716-cl-ppaca.pdf.
9
See CMS Voluntary Self-Referral Disclosure Protocol, CMS.GOV (revised
May
6
,
2011)
[hereinafter
SRDP],
http://www.cms.gov/PhysicianSelfReferral/Downloads/6409_SRDP_Protocol.pdf.
10
See infra Part III.
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As of July 2011, only seventy providers had taken advantage of
the SRDP.11 CMS has stated that it is pleased with the numbers to
date.12 However, when those seventy disclosures are viewed in the
context of the Medicare program as a whole, it is difficult to understand why CMS is happy with those numbers. There are over 6,100
hospitals and 932,700 physicians participating in the Medicare program.13 Hospitals are the focus of this Article, as physicians are rarely
prosecuted under Stark.14
Consider the number of potential Stark issues at those 6,100 hospitals. Even the smallest hospital has numerous contracts with physicians that create potential Stark issues.15 But assume for a moment
that each hospital has a few hundred to a thousand or more such arrangements. Kevin McAnaney, a former CMS official now in private
practice, has estimated that 95 percent of hospitals have “technical”
violations of Stark arising out of their arrangements with physicians.16
McAnaney did not define a “technical,” as opposed to a substantive,
violation. It is likely he was referring to a violation of the regulations
that specify exactly how an arrangement can fall under a Stark exception. For example, one exception to Stark permits self-referrals by
physicians if the remuneration is at fair market value.17 For an ar-

11

Katherine A. Lauer & Robert L. Roth, Am. Health Lawyers Ass’n Webinar Presentation, Medicare Repayments and Disclosures , at 23 (June 16, 2011) (on file with
author).
12
Julie E. Kass et al., Seven Months Later: An Interactive Dialogue Regarding Initial Experiences and Practical Advice in Dealing with CMS’ Self-Referral
Disclosure Protocol, AM. HEALTH LAWYERS ASS’N (Apr. 11, 2011)
http://www.healthlawyers.org/Events/Webinars/RoundtableDiscussions/2011/Docum
ents/roundtable_discussion_recording_041111.mp3.
13
2010
Edition:
Data
Compendium,
CMS.GOV
(2010),
https://www.cms.gov/DataCompendium/downloads/2010ProvidersSupp.zip (according to Providers Table VI.1 & VI.6, over 95 percent of physicians are Medicare program participants).
14
See infra Part I.A.
15
CMS Postpones Hospital Reporting of Disclosure of Financial Relationships
Report
(DFRR),
CMS.GOV
[hereinafter
DFRR],
https://www.cms.gov/PhysicianSelfReferral/70_Disclosure.asp#TopOfPage
(last
visited July 25, 2011). DFRR, initially proposed in 2008, would have required hospitals to document and disclose to CMS all financial relationships with physicians. Id.
After multiple CMS modifications of timeline and cost estimates, DFRR reporting
was delayed pending implementation of new hospital disclosure requirements under
PPACA § 6001. Id.
16
OIG ‘Open Letter’ to Industry Cites Kickbacks in Self-Disclosure Protocol, 13 HEALTH CARE FRAUD REP. (BNA) 258 (2009).
17
42 U.S.C. § 1395nn(h)(3) (2006). Fair market value is broadly considered
to be the value of arms-length transactions, consistent with general market value.
Where applicable, fair market value also factors in the value of rental property for
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rangement to jump that hurdle, it must meet several procedural requirements, including that the arrangement be set out in a written
document signed by the parties, and specify the compensation in advance.18 Failure to follow those steps probably constitutes the sort of
“technical” violation to which McAnaney refers.
Even if McAnaney’s estimate is largely hyperbole, it is clear that
thousands of hospitals, each with thousands of physician relationships, should generate many more than seventy self-disclosures. The
former New York State Medicaid Inspector General, James Sheehan,
said that he considers the number and extent of disclosures a good
outcome measure of his agency’s effectiveness in running the New
York State Medicaid self-disclosure program.19 Applying that measure to the CMS program, it is a dismal failure.
The fact that providers are, by and large, not choosing to selfdisclose Stark violations to CMS, despite the enormous penalties for
nondisclosure,20 should cause CMS to rethink the current SRDP. Providers do have other options for self-disclosure of various fraud and
abuse issues. These include (1) simple refunds to the appropriate fiscal intermediary, (2) self-disclosure of an issue involving the AntiKickback Statute to the HHS Office of the Inspector General (OIG),
or, for the most serious matters, (3) a report to the Department of Justice (DOJ) through the local Assistant U.S. Attorney. For Stark-only
issues, however, CMS has stated that providers should use its protocol, the SRDP. If providers choose not to take advantage of this opportunity to come forward voluntarily, the government fails to recover
money that the Medicare program is owed. Costs of enforcement are
then unnecessarily high, and providers who might voluntarily return
overpayments if the incentives were properly aligned choose instead
to roll the dice and hope they do not get caught.
HHS is under tremendous pressure to recover program dollars lost
to fraud. The National Health Care Anti-Fraud Association, an organization of private insurers and public agencies, conservatively estimates that some $60 billion (about 3 percent of total annual health-

general commercial use, less any value for proximity or convenience as a potential
source of patient referrals. Id.
18
See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn(e)(1)(A) (rental of office space or equipment); id. § 1395nn(e)(3) (personal services arrangements).
19
James Sheehan, & Robert Hussar, Self-Disclosures by Medicaid Providers,
N.Y. OFF. OF MEDICAID INSPECTOR GEN. 38 (Sept. 14, 2010),
http://www.omig.ny.gov/data/images/stories/Webinar/9-1410_omig_self_disclosure_webinar.pdf.
20
See infra Part II.
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care spending) is lost to fraud every year.21 During the congressional
debate on the ACA, proponents of the bill touted fraud recovery as an
important source of funding to counterbalance the costs of extending
insurance coverage to millions of new people.22 During fiscal year
2010, the federal government won or negotiated approximately $2.5
billion in health-care fraud judgments and settlements, and attained
additional administrative settlements or penalties.23 In an attempt to
raise that number even higher, the ACA increased the budget of the
Health Care Fraud and Abuse Control Program by $10 million per
year for 2011–2019, and increased funding for the OIG, FBI, and
Medicare Integrity Program by the rate of increase in the Consumer
Price Index over the previous year for 2011–2019.24
However, as Professor Joan Krause pointed out in a recent article,
while billions of dollars in fraud recovery may seem like a lot of
money, it pales in comparison to estimates of money lost each year to
fraud.25 Krause also makes the point that more resources allocated to
prosecution will not necessarily result in increased fraud recovery:
If it were really that easy to recover hundreds of billions of dollars through anti-fraud efforts, chances are
we would have made more progress by now. It is easy
to blame our failure on the refusal to invest sufficient
resources, or our blind adherence to outdated detection
strategies. But that doesn’t account for the fact that
legions of very bright, dedicated, well-intentioned
policymakers and prosecutors have been doing the best
they can for many years, with only limited success.
Assuming that now we will be able to find the key to
health care fraud enforcement—and that the recoveries
21

Vicki Lee Parker, Treasure Might be Buried in Medical Bills, NAT’L
HEALTH CARE ANTI-FRAUD ASS’N (Apr.
12,
2007,
7:15
AM),
http://www.nhcaa.org/eweb/dynamicPage.aspx?webcode=about_nhcaa&wpscode=Tr
easuremightbeburiedinmedicalbills.
22
John K. Iglehart, Finding Money for Health Care Reform – Rooting Out
Waste, Fraud, and Abuse, 361 NEW ENG. J. MED. 229, 229-31 (2009) (discussing
governmental efforts to strengthen antifraud measures to increase recoupment of
improper payments).
23
DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERV’S. & DEP’T OF JUSTICE, HEALTH CARE
FRAUD AND ABUSE CONTROL PROGRAM ANNUAL REPORT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2010 8
(2011), available at http://oig.hhs.gov/publications/docs/hcfac/hcfacreport2010.pdf.
24
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111–148, §
6402(i), 124 Stat. 119, 760 (2010) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1395(i)(k)).
25
Joan H. Krause, Following the Money in Health Care Fraud: Reflections
on a Modern-Day Yellow Brick Road, 36 AM. J.L. & MED. 343, 355–56 (2010) (discussing difficulties with calculating the amount of money attributed to fraud).
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will be enough to fund a large chunk of the health care
reform effort—simply strains credulity.26
While it is undoubtedly important for CMS to protect the public
fisc generally, and the tremendously expensive Medicare program in
particular, this Article argues that more provider-friendly rules and
procedures would encourage provider self-disclosure of improper
practices, thus improving the government’s recovery of health-care
program dollars more effectively than pouring larger and larger
amounts of money into increasing enforcement efforts.
This Article sets out in Part I an overview of the Stark Law, explaining how it applies to physicians, hospitals, and other health-care
entities. Part II summarizes the SRDP requirements and process for
disclosure of Stark issues, and the results of the SRDP to date. Part
III details why certain SRDP provisions make it difficult for providers
to self-disclose even minor violations of Stark without paying large
fines and/or risking exclusion from the Medicare or Medicaid program. Finally, Part IV proposes a demonstration project to test possible improvements to the SRDP.
HHS has used demonstration or pilot projects in the past, and the
ACA specifically directs HHS to create projects that offer the possibility of reducing Medicare and Medicaid expenditures while preserving or enhancing the quality of care provided in the programs.27 Using the demonstration project format to test changes to the SRDP in a
few states will allow CMS to determine whether it could relax the
protocol’s current requirements, making it more “provider-friendly”
without increased risk of abuse. If the test is successful in terms of
revenue raised and increased provider compliance with the law, CMS
could then revise the SRDP through the normal regulatory process. A
demonstration project provides the perfect vehicle to prove that improved self-disclosure protocols for the Stark Law can decrease enforcement costs, improve program integrity, and encourage providers
to deal responsibly with the minor lapses in compliance that inevitably
arise in such an enormous government program as Medicare.

26

Id. at 364.
See § 3021(a), 124 Stat. at 389 (creating the Center for Medicare and
Medicaid Innovation).
27
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BACKGROUND ON THE STARK LAW
A.

Basic Provisions

The Stark Law limits a physician’s ability to refer patients for certain services to entities in which the physician or an immediate family
member has a financial interest, unless an exception applies.28 It was
originally enacted to curb rampant Medicare abuse by physicians and
hospitals, particularly in the 1980s. Physicians referred patients to
facilities they owned or otherwise had a financial interest in, regardless of whether patients actually needed the tests or services for which
they were being referred.29 The purpose of the law, as Rep. Stark
described it, was threefold: (1) assure that physicians refer patients to
the highest quality provider available rather than to a provider with
whom the physician has a financial relationship, (2) prevent overutilization of Medicare and Medicaid, and (3) promote legitimate competition among providers.30 Rep. Stark hoped that the law would provide
a “bright line rule” and “unequivocal guidance” for providers.31
The Stark Law prohibits physician referrals to an entity for “designated health services” if the physician (or a member of the physician’s immediate family) has a “financial relationship” with that entity.32 The term “financial relationship” is defined very broadly. It
includes ownership and any type of compensation arrangement.33
“Designated health services” include lab, radiology, inpatient, and
outpatient hospital services, among other things.34 The Stark Law
prohibits any entity from billing government payment programs, such
as Medicare, for services provided pursuant to a noncompliant referral
during the “period of disallowance.”35
28

42 U.S.C. §§ 1395nn(b)-(e) (2006); 42 C.F.R. §§ 411.353(a), (e) (2010).
135 CONG. REC. 2035 (1989) (statement of Rep. Pete Stark, introducing
the Ethics in Patient Referrals Act of 1988).
30
Id.
31
Id.
32
42 U.S.C. § 1395nn(a)(1); 42 C.F.R. §§ 411.353(a), (c)(1).
33
42 U.S.C. § 1395nn(a)(2); 42 C.F.R. § 411.354(a).
34
42 U.S.C. § 1395nn(h)(6); 42 C.F.R. § 411. 351.
35
42 C.F.R. § 411.353(c). This period is defined as “starting on the date the
financial relationship is first noncompliant and lasting until no later than (1) the date
on which the financial relationship satisfies an exception; (2) the date on which all
excess compensation is returned to the party that paid it; or (3) the date on which all
additional required compensation is paid to the party to which it is owed.” Lesley
Reynolds & Ben Koplin, Overpayment Liability and Self-Disclosure Under the New
CMS Protocol, J. HEALTH CARE COMPLIANCE, May–June 2011, at 23, 24. Because
the regulation used “no later than,” rather than “the latter of,” the regulation could be
seen as extending the period of disallowance “beyond the date the financial relation29
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The Stark Law applies to both Medicare36 and Medicaid;37 however, due to hospitals’ and physicians’ particular dependence on
Medicare as a source of revenue, most commentators refer to the Stark
Law’s application only in connection with Medicare. Additionally,
although the Stark Law addresses physician referrals, enforcement of
the statute has generally focused on hospitals’ submissions of claims
resulting from physician referral because hospitals are seen as having
“deeper pockets” than physicians.38 As the American Health Lawyers
Association (AHLA) White Paper on Stark Enforcement stated,
“Stark enforcement against physicians is almost nonexistent and there
is little reason to believe that will change. Given this, it is not surprising the physicians often view Stark compliance as the hospital’s problem.”39 So as not to contribute to this misperception, this Article uses
the term “provider” to reference physicians, hospitals, nursing homes,
laboratories, medical device manufacturers, pharmaceutical companies, and any other provider of health-care services to recipients of
federal government health-care program benefits.
B.

Application of the Stark Law

Some of the common practices and arrangements that implicate
Stark are referrals within a group practice, medical director agreements and physician part-time employment or independent contractor
agreements.40 Other situations in which Stark issues arise are physician investment in hospitals or ambulatory surgical centers, and arrangements between physicians and other designated health service
providers such as clinical laboratories, diagnostic imaging centers,
physical therapy companies, durable medical equipment companies,
and lease agreements for space or equipment.41 Other types of agreements that raise Stark issues are hospital-physician recruitment
agreements, marketing agreements with entities owned by physician
ship is technically cured to the date on which any excess compensation is finally
returned or money due is finally paid.” Id.
36
42 U.S.C. § 1395nn.
37
42 C.F.R. § 411.353(a).
38
AM. HEALTH LAWYERS ASS’N, PUB. INTEREST COMM., A PUBLIC POLICY
DISCUSSION: TAKING THE MEASURE OF THE STARK LAW 5 (2009) [hereinafter WHITE
PAPER],
http://www.healthlawyers.org/hlresources/PI/Policy/Documents/Stark%20White%20
Paper.pdf.
39
Id. at 10.
40
42 U.S.C. §§ 1395nn(b), (e)(2), (e)(4); 42 C.F.R. §§ 411.355, 411.357(c),
(g), (h).
41
42 U.S.C. §§ 1395nn(e)(1), (8); 42 C.F.R. §§ 411.357(a), (b), (i), (k), (l),
(p).
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or hospital investors that do not reflect fair market value for necessary
services, and practice compensation programs that reward shareholders or employee-physicians based on orders of designated health services.42
The reason that these practices and arrangements often pass muster is that Stark contains numerous exceptions, covering the most
common types of financial relationships between hospitals and physicians. For example, exceptions are made for fair market value compensation, employment agreements, personal services arrangements,
and office space rental.43 There are also numerous exceptions applicable to physicians practicing in groups,44 as well as an exception for
services personally performed by a physician.45 Each of these exceptions has very specific requirements, and failure to meet those requirements will result in a Stark violation. For example, the employment exception requires that there be a written agreement for a term of
at least one year that is signed by both parties. The agreement must
set out the compensation formula, which cannot change during the
term of the agreement. The compensation must be at fair market
value, and may not be determined in a manner that takes into account
the volume or value of referrals generated by the physician.46
An example will help illustrate the interplay of these various provisions. Suppose the fictional infectious disease specialist, Dr. Gregory House,47 has a thriving private practice in addition to his employment at the Princeton-Plainsboro Teaching Hospital. He refers many
patients to the hospital each year for inpatient admission or for various
diagnostic or treatment services. Absent an exception in the Stark
Law, Dr. House’s employment relationship with the hospital would
“taint” his referrals to the hospital. However, as long as the hospital
and Dr. House meet all the technical requirements of the employment
exception, Dr. House can refer patients to the hospital without triggering either the referral or billing prohibitions of the Stark law.

(p).

42

42 U.S.C. §§ 1395nn(e)(3)(B), (e)(5); 42 C.F.R. §§ 411.357(e), (i), (k), (l),

43

42 U.S.C. § 1395nn (e); 42 C.F.R. § 411.357.
42 U.S.C. § 1395nn(b); 42 C.F.R. § 411.355.
42 U.S.C. § 1395nn(e)(3)(A); 42 C.F.R. § 411.357(d).
42 U.S.C. § 1395nn(e)(2); 42 C.F.R. § 411.357(c).
House (FOX Broadcasting Co. Nov. 16, 2004).

44
45
46
47
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Stark and Intent

The Stark Law overlaps significantly the Anti-Kickback Statute,48
a criminal law which prohibits the knowing offering of any remuneration in order to secure referrals to federal health-care programs, including Medicare.49 Similar to Stark, the Anti-Kickback Statute is
aimed at financial relationships that potentially influence physicians to
refer patients inappropriately for the physicians’ own financial gain.50
So why was the Stark law necessary? Rep. Stark described it this
way:
One of the most serious shortcoming[s] of current law
is the enormous difficulty involved in proving to the
satisfaction of a judge in a criminal or civil enforcement action that a particular arrangement is deliberately structured to induce referrals. A successful
prosecution requires a lengthy investigation of the
business records to prove unequivocally that dividend
payments to physicians were intended as disguised
payment of a referral fee. The enforcement resources
simply aren’t there. There is no way that the Inspector
General—with fewer than 500 investigators nationwide, can adequately police the complex business arrangements that underpin the $100 billion a year
Medicare program.51
While the lack of an intent requirement certainly achieves Rep.
Stark’s goal of making a Stark violation easier to prove than a violation of the Anti-Kickback Statute, it also makes it very easy for providers to unintentionally, or even unknowingly, run afoul of the statute. In fact, it is so easy to do so that the Stark Law is often referred
to as a “strict liability” statute.52 For example, if Dr. House forgot to
sign the employment contract between himself and PrincetonPlainsboro, any referrals he made to the hospital would be improper,
even if the failure to sign was merely an oversight. This would be
true even if the hospital signed the agreement, paid Dr. House accord48

Anti-Kickback Statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b (2011).
Id.
50
135 CONG. REC. 2035 (1989).
51
Id.
52
Richard Lower & Robert D. Stone, Off with Their Heads! Summary Execution for Technical Stark Violations – and a Proposal to Commute the Sentence, J.
HEALTH & LIFE SCI. L., Apr. 2010, at 112, 147 (discussing the strict liability nature of
Stark violations despite no intent and no harm brought to patients or the public);
Reynolds & Koplin, supra note 35, at 24 (no showing of intent required under Stark).
49
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ing to its terms at fair market value, and made sure that Dr. House
performed the duties set out in the contract. Dr. House and the hospital would also be liable for Stark violations if both parties had properly signed the agreement but its initial term had lapsed, and the parties inadvertently failed to renew the agreement, but continued to perform according to its terms.
The lack of an intent requirement coupled with the complexity of
the law has caused Stark to be criticized as inflexible and excessively
punitive almost since its passage.53 Numerous amendments and HHS
regulatory changes have only made the Stark Law more difficult for
providers to interpret and follow.54 The AHA recently described the
Stark Laws as “increasingly complex, confusing and continually
changing . . . .”55 Though the AHA had originally supported the Stark
Law when it was introduced by Rep. Stark, as CMS was preparing to
release the SRDP, it asked CMS for changes and clarifications in the
proposed disclosure protocol, because it had seen the “unintended
consequences of the current rules” and wanted CMS to “restore fairness” to the law.56
D.

Penalties under Stark

If the penalties under Stark were inconsequential, the strict liability aspect of the law would not be so significant. As it is, however,
Stark can result in “ruinous financial liability.”57 Penalties include
denial of payment for claims submitted as a result of an unlawful relationship,58 mandated refunds of amounts collected in violation of
Stark,59 and fines assessed by the OIG.60 The total penalty amounts in
Stark cases are often in the millions of dollars.61
53
See Steven D. Wales, The Stark Law: Boon or Boondoggle? An Analysis
of the Prohibition on Physician Self-Referrals, 27 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 1, 22-24
(2003) (citing commentators’ descriptions of Stark as “confusing,” “complicated,”
“over-reaching, too complex and intrusive,” “antiquated,” among many others).
54
WHITE PAPER, supra note 38, at 6.
55
AHA Letter, supra note 8, at 1.
56
Id. at 4.
57
Ankur J. Goel & Daniel H. Melvin, New CMS Self-Disclosure Protocol
Fundamentally Changes the Landscape For Stark Law Compliance and Enforcement,
14 HEALTH CARE FRAUD REP. (BNA) 862 (2010).
58
42 U.S.C. § 1395nn(g)(1) (2006); 42 C.F.R. § 411.353(b) (2010).
59
42 U.S.C. § 1395nn(g)(2); 42 C.F.R. § 411.353(d).
60
Civil Monetary Penalties, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1320a-7a (2011); 42 C.F.R. §
1003.102(b) (2010). A CMP is an administrative remedy that gives providers very
limited rights to review in the courts.
61
See, e.g., Press Release, Dept. of Justice, Covenant Medical Center to Pay
U.S. $4.5 Million to Resolve False Claims Act Allegations (Aug. 25, 2009), available
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If providers exhibit intent to violate Stark, they can be liable for
additional fines through the application of civil monetary penalties
(CMPs). HHS has the authority to impose CMPs up to $15,000 per
claim, depending on the specifics of the offense, and up to $100,000
per arrangement which the physician or entity knew or should have
known had the principal purpose of assuring referrals which, if made
directly, would violate the Stark Law.62 Providers may also be permanently excluded from participation in federal health-care programs,
meaning that no goods or services furnished by an excluded provider
are reimbursable under federal health-care programs. Furthermore,
other providers may not employ or contract with excluded providers.63
The ACA extended CMPs to any person who “knows of an overpayment . . . [and] does not report and return the overpayment . . . .” 64
A Stark violation can also trigger the application of the False
Claims Act (FCA). The FCA is not specifically a health-care statute;
instead, it prohibits the knowing submission of “false or fraudulent”
claims for payment to the federal government.65 Violations of the
FCA are punishable by up to treble damages and an $11,000 per-claim
penalty.66 Prior to the 2009 passage of the Fraud Enforcement and
Recovery Act (FERA), a Stark violation would trigger the FCA if a
provider submitted claims for payment that had arisen out of an illegal
financial relationship under Stark. The FCA stated that any person
who “knowingly makes, uses, or causes to be made or used, a false
record or statement to conceal, avoid, or decrease an obligation to pay
or transmit money or property to the [g]overnment” had violated the

at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2009/August/09-civ-849.html; Press Release, Dept.
of Justice, Northside Hospital and Doctors’ Groups Pay $6.37 Million to U.S. to
Settle
False
Claims
Act
Suit
(Oct.
20,
2006),
available
at
http://www.justice.gov/usao/gan/press/2006/10-20-06b.pdf; Press Release, Dept. of
Justice, St. Joseph Medical Center in Maryland to Pay U.S. $22 Million to Resolve
False
Claims
Act
Allegations
(Nov.
9,
2010),
available
at
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2010/November/10-civ-1271.html.
62
42 U.S.C. §§ 1395nn(g)(3)-(4) (2011).
63
Publication of the OIG Special Advisory Bulletin on the Effect of Exclusion from Participation in Federal Health Care Programs, 64 Fed. Reg. 52,791, 52,792
(Sept. 30, 1999).
64
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111–148, §
6402(d)(2)(A)(iii), 124 Stat. 119, 758 (2010) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1320a7a(a)).
65
False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729(a)(1)(A)-(G) (Supp. III 2010).
66
Id. § 3729(a)(1). The original $10,000 per claim penalty was adjusted
upward for inflation. 28 C.F.R. §§ 85.3, (a)(9) (2008).
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FCA.67 Providers had to engage in an affirmative act intended to
avoid or conceal the obligation to repay.68
With the passage of the FERA, providers became liable not only
for affirmative acts that conceal overpayments, but also for the failure
to repay an identified overpayment.69 No attempt to conceal is required. Simply avoiding the obligation to repay is enough to trigger
the FCA. Anyone who “knowingly makes, uses, or causes to be made
or used, a false record or statement material to an obligation to pay or
transmit money or property to the Government, or knowingly conceals
or knowingly and improperly avoids or decreases an obligation to pay
or transmit money or property to the Government . . .” has violated the
FCA.70
In addition to creating an affirmative obligation for providers to
“report and return” overpayments, the ACA made another significant
change to the FCA. It established a sixty-day window within which
an “identified” overpayment must be reported and returned to the
government.71 The statute starts tolling on either the day that the
claim is submitted or the day that a corresponding cost report is due,
whichever is later.72 Prior to the ACA, HHS regulations had used
sixty days as the definition of a “prompt refund” required for proper
handling of incorrect collections.73 The ACA simply applied that time
limit to the FCA.
E.

Qui Tam Actions and the Stark Law

The FCA rewards whistleblowers who report suspected violations
of the FCA. A whistleblower can file suit as a qui tam relator.74 If the
government decides to intervene in the qui tam action and ultimately
reaches a cash settlement or prevails in court, the qui tam relator can
receive up to one-fourth of the government’s recovery as a reward for
67

False Claims Act 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(7) (2006).
Id.
69
False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(G) (Supp. III 2010).
70
Id.; see generally id. § 3729(b)(1) (stating that “knowingly” means that a
person either has “actual knowledge of the information,” “acts in deliberate ignorance
of the truth…of the information,” or “acts in reckless disregard of the truth…of the
information,” regardless of a lack of specific intent to defraud).
71
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111–148, §
6402(a), 124 Stat. 119, 755 (2010) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7k(d)(2)).
72
Id.
73
Timing and Methods of Handling, 42 C.F.R. § 489.41 (2010).
74
Under the FCA, a qui tam relator is a private individual who brings an
allegation of fraud or abuse to the government. False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. §
3730(b)(1) (2006).
68
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alerting the government to the false claims.75 Qui tam relators therefore have every incentive to push for prosecution of even the most
minor Stark violation. In addition, relators are unaffected by the
counterbalancing policy concerns that normally restrain prosecutors in
situations where the government has not truly been harmed by an inadvertent violation.76
Most Stark-related legal action arises in the form of suits by qui
tam relators rather than prosecutors.77 Between 1986 and 2008, 62
percent of FCA cases were initiated and filed by qui tam relators.78
These relators have no incentive to take a provider’s record of overall
compliance with Medicare into consideration, and every incentive to
seek the maximum penalty. The prominent role of qui tam relators in
health-care fraud cases has led to a situation where many Stark enforcement actions fail to assess the seriousness of an offense or prioritize prosecutorial resources.79
The linkage between Stark and the FCA provides most of the
teeth for Stark enforcement. Consider our example involving Dr.
House and his unsigned agreement. Assume the unsigned agreement
was not discovered for several years after the omission occurred. All
claims that Dr. House or the hospital made to government payers,
such as Medicare, for services provided by either party over the year
in which the agreement was in place are overpayments. This is true
regardless of whether or not the patients needed the services or the
services were provided appropriately. The government’s position is
that the contract between the doctor and the hospital was improper.
As a result, all services provided under that contract were improperly
75

Id. § 3730(d)(1)-(2).
See Joan H. Krause, Health Care Providers and the Public Fisc: Paradigms of Government Harm Under the Civil False Claims Act, 36 GA. L. REV. 121,
203 (2001) (discussing concerns that prosecutorial discretion is undermined when the
DOJ is forced to allocate significant resources to reviewing numerous qui tam filings); cf. Dayna Bowen Matthew, The Moral Hazard Problem with Privatization of
Public Enforcement: The Case of Pharmaceutical Fraud, 40 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM
281, 297-98 (2007) (recognizing prosecutorial discretion is minimized by qui tam
filings, though the government may have economic incentive to allow them to proceed to litigation).
77
WHITE PAPER, supra note 38, at 3.
78
Robert T. Rhoad & Matthew F. Fornataro, A Gathering Storm: The New
False Claims Act Amendments and Their Impact on Healthcare Fraud Enforcement,
21 HEALTH LAWYER 14, 16 (Aug. 2009) (discussing the use of False Claims Act qui
tam cases in healthcare fraud enforcement).
79
See Lower & Stone, supra note 52, at 122-25; see also Matthew, supra
note 76, at 297-98 (discussing FCA qui tam enforcement, although the author’s premise is likely applicable to the increased role of qui tam relators in health care fraud
generally).
76
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provided. Therefore, any money the government paid on any of the
claims constitutes an overpayment that must be repaid. Even if the
hospital was not aware of the oversight, the strict liability aspect of
Stark means that the hospital and Dr. House are now liable for repayment of all the claims made for care of patients that Dr. House admitted to the hospital or otherwise referred there for services.
In addition, the hospital and Dr. House are liable for CMPs under
the FCA if they become aware of the overpayments and do not repay
them within sixty days. These penalties generally consist of a perclaim penalty of $11,000 plus three times the amount of the overpayment (in other words, the total value of referrals made in the case of a
Stark violation).80 Depending on how many referrals Dr. House has
sent to the hospital during the applicable time period, the amount of
the potential penalties could add up to millions of dollars—all for a
lapsed agreement with no harm to the government or patients.
It is important to note that, due to the strict liability nature of
Stark, most of the penalties that could be assessed against a provider
in a situation such as the one involving Dr. House would be identical
to the penalties in a situation in which Dr. House and the hospital entered into a covert scheme to pay Dr. House kickbacks for referring
patients to the hospital (with the exception of penalties requiring actual or constructive knowledge). The obligation to return overpayments resulting from a relationship that violated Stark would be the
same in both situations. If the government took the position that the
providers had “identified” the overpayments and failed to return them,
the additional penalties possible under the CMP statute and FCA penalties for failure to return those when discovered would also be the
same.81 To add to Dr. House and the hospital’s woes, a disgruntled
clerk who learns of Dr. House’s failure to sign the agreement can also
pursue a qui tam action against Dr. House and the hospital.
The stringent penalties possible under Stark are exacerbated by
the possibility that qui tam relators can use the facts revealed by providers in self-disclosures to the government as the basis for their qui
tam action. Providers may actually be giving qui tam relators ammunition when the providers voluntarily step forward to acknowledge
violations of the law that would have otherwise been unknown to the
relators or the government. The FCA generally bars private parties
from bringing qui tam suits based on the public disclosure that is part
80

False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1) (Supp. III 2010).
42 U.S.C. § 1395nn(g)(4) (2006). A Stark CMP of up to $100,000 per
arrangement may be assessed against a physician or entity for participation in an
“arrangement or scheme” which the party knows or should know has the principle
purpose of securing referrals. Id.
81
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of a criminal, civil or administration hearing; a congressional, administrative, or Government Accounting Office report, hearing, audit, or
investigation; or from the news media.82
Some courts have taken the position that voluntary disclosures
made to the government on a party’s own initiative rather than in response to a government inquiry do not constitute a “public disclosure.” For example, in United States ex. rel. Liotine v. CDW Gov’t
Inc., the court determined that the plaintiff’s qui tam allegation was
not “publically disclosed” by the defendant’s voluntary disclosure of
similar information to the government, when that information was
uncovered by the defendant’s internal audit and not as a result of an
audit “‘undertaken by authorized government officials with official
purposes.’”83
Other courts have held that voluntary disclosure does bar an FCA
qui tam action. For example, a district court in United States ex rel.
Cosens v. Yale-New Haven Hospital held that statements to Medicare
investigators were a “public disclosure.”84 Although this question is
beyond the scope of this Article, these cases suffice to illustrate the
point that providers have reason to be concerned that their voluntary
disclosures may subsequently be used against them by qui tam plaintiffs.
F.

“Technical” v. “Substantive” Stark Issues

As noted earlier, Rep. Stark’s purpose in proposing this law was
to target intentional activity without saddling administrative agencies
with the difficulties of proving intent. While it makes sense to relax
the standard of proof in order to assure that providers cannot easily
avoid the purpose of the statute, if the statute is blindly applied without any consideration for proportionality between the violation and
punishment, the public policy rationale behind the statute may be undermined. This problem is especially acute in situations of so-called
“technical” violations of Stark. Providers contend that these “technical” violations should be treated differently from substantive viola-

82

False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(A) (2006).
United States ex rel. Liotine v. CDW Gov’t Inc., No. 05-33-DRH, 2009
WL 3156704, at *7 (S.D.Ill. Sept. 29, 2009) (quoting United States ex rel. Mathews v.
Bank of Farmington, 166 F.3d 853, 862 (7th Cir. 1999); see also United States ex rel.
Rost v. Pfizer, Inc., 507 F.3d 720, 730 (1st Cir. 2007) (rejecting the notion that voluntary disclosure to the government can constitute a public disclosure).
84
United States ex rel. Cosens v. Yale-New Haven Hosp., 233 F. Supp. 2d
319, 327 (D. Conn. 2002).
83
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tions, both in terms of the process the government uses to resolve
overpayment issues and the penalties assessed.
Most issues that arise under Stark are matters relating to compliance with the specific requirements for meeting the language of various exceptions rather than any more substantive problem. Strict enforcement of technical violations with application of the same penalties as are used for more serious issues produces potentially unjust
penalties. Kevin McAnaney, Chief of the OIG’s Industry Guidance
Branch from its creation in 1997 until May 2003, has stated that most
of the issues under Stark relate to these technical violations rather than
anything more substantive. He has written that “[t]he Stark statute is
so potentially unfair—the rules have gotten increasingly more technical and penalties are draconian—and even though CMS has never
gone after hospitals, the potential liability is a Damocles sword over
them.”85 McAnaney’s sentiments were echoed in the AHLA White
Paper on the Stark Law, which was based on two Convener Sessions
held in April and June 2009.86 The participants in the sessions included in-house counsel to health-care providers, academics, attorneys
in firms representing providers and qui tam relators, and former government attorneys. Attorneys currently serving the government observed but did not participate in the sessions. The AHLA White Paper
concluded that “innocent or highly technical violations [of the Stark
law] can result in ruinous liability,” and “technical violations that
cause no harm to the federal program can trigger huge penalties.”87
Two practitioners recently noted that, because of the Stark law,
the health-care industry is in a particularly difficult situation when
simple mistakes are made:
Such mistakes occur in every corner of every industry
of a modern, fast-paced economy. But in every other
industry, the law provides the parties with options to
resolve compliance problems uncovered from their internal reviews—to execute contract amendments or
new contracts with retroactive effective dates, to enter
into repayment arrangements, or to reform their contracts based on the doctrines of mutual mistake or
85
OIG ‘Open Letter’ to Industry Cites Kickbacks in Self-Disclosure Protocol, supra note 16; see also AHA Letter, supra note 8, at 3 (Stark’s increased complexities make it difficult for compliance by even the best intentioned providers,
leaving open the possibility of disproportionately large liability in relation to the
conduct giving rise to the violation).
86
WHITE PAPER, supra note 38, at 1.
87
Id. at 3, 6.
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course of dealing. If they uncover minor compliance
violations, they have a means of fixing them and putting them to rest. This is not the case for healthcare
providers trapped by the highly technical requirements
of the Stark law.88
Social science research supports the notion that if providers believe
the law punishes minor procedural failings in the same way as it punishes intentional attempts to improperly influence referral patterns, the
providers will be less likely to comply with the law. Professor Paul
Robinson has written about the importance of the government having
“moral credibility” when attempting to convince people to obey the
law.89 He argues that simply enacting a statute is not enough to persuade individuals and companies to obey the law. People must see the
law as having moral credibility. Robinson goes on to define “moral
credibility” as the law’s reputation for punishing those who deserve it,
under rules perceived as just. Furthermore, he says, the law must protect from punishment those who do not deserve punishment and assure that any punishment levied is in the amount deserved—“no more
and no less.”90 In his book, Why People Obey the Law, sociologist
Tom Tyler states, in a similar vein, that “[i]t is interesting that people
appear to connect the obligations of authorities to issues of fair procedure, not to outcomes. It is being unfairly treated that disrupts the
relationship of legitimacy to compliance, not receiving poor outcomes.”91
In 2007, CMS seemed on the verge of recognizing that some
types of Stark violations are less serious than others. CMS proposed
regulations that would create new criteria by which providers could
satisfy Stark exceptions in situations where the failure to satisfy the
exception was merely “procedural.”92
The alternative method for compliance with the physician self-referral prohibition would provide that, if an
arrangement does not meet all of the existing pre88

Lower & Stone, supra note 52, at 118 (discussing the CMS position that
state law contract doctrines are not available to remedy technical violations of Stark,
citing 73 Fed. Reg. 48434, 48703 (Aug. 19, 2008)).
89
See generally Paul H. Robinson, Moral Credibility and Crime: Why People Obey the Law, CURRENT, June 1995, at 10.
90
Id. at 12.
91
TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 172 (2006).
92
Medicare Program; Proposed Revisions to Payment Policies Under the
Physician Fee Schedule, and Other Part B Payment Policies for CY 2008, 72 Fed.
Reg. 38,122, 38,185 (proposed July 12, 2007).
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scribed criteria of an exception, the arrangement nevertheless would meet the exception if: (1) The facts
and circumstances of the arrangement are selfdisclosed by the parties to us; (2) we determine that
the arrangement satisfied all but the prescribed procedural or “form” requirements of the exception at the
time of the referral for DHS at issue and at the time of
the claim for such DHS; (3) the failure to meet all the
prescribed criteria of the exception was inadvertent;
(4) the referral for DHS and the claim for DHS were
not made with knowledge that one or more of the prescribed criteria of the exception were not met (consistent with other exceptions, we would apply the same
knowledge standard as that applicable under the False
Claims Act); (5) the parties have brought (or will bring
as soon as possible) the arrangement into complete
compliance with the prescribed criteria of the exception or have terminated (or will terminate as soon as
possible) the financial relationship between or among
them; (6) the arrangement did not pose a risk of program or patient abuse; (7) no more than a set amount
of time had passed since the time of the original noncompliance with the prescribed criteria; and (8) the arrangement at issue is not the subject of an ongoing
Federal investigation or other proceeding (including,
but not limited to, an enforcement matter.93
CMS specified that the alternative method was not intended to be
used in situations where there was a question of whether the compensation was at “fair market value, not related to volume or value of
referrals, or set in advance.”94 This sort of exception was to be reserved for procedural issues such as a missing signature or an expired
employment agreement still being followed by the parties.95
CMS received thousands of comments about the proposed regulation. While most of the comments applauded CMS’s goal of setting
aside non-substantive violations, many were skeptical of the approach.
Commenters expressed concern about the amount of discretion CMS

93

Id.
Id.
95
Id. Consideration of an alternative method of Stark compliance for these
types of technical violations has been supported by a number of providers, their counsel, and interest groups. See infra Part IV.D.
94
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would have to assess a provider’s motivation.96 CMS specified that it
would retain sole discretion to determine whether the relationship met
the terms of the exception. Parties had no right to an administrative or
judicial review of this determination.97
Rather than decrease the scope of the agency’s discretion in response to these concerns, CMS chose instead to greatly narrow the
scope of the exception. The final version was limited to situations in
which providers comply with all Stark requirements other than the
signature requirement, and only for very limited time periods.98 The
final rule eliminated most of the eight criteria originally proposed,
including the requirements that parties self-disclose a noncompliant
relationship, and that CMS determine the relationship satisfactory in
all areas but the procedural criteria. Instead, CMS chose to allow providers to take advantage of this alternative policy for compliance only
when the relationship in question fulfills all criteria of an exception
except for the signature requirement.99
Unfortunately, those limitations are so narrow as to make the exception practically irrelevant for most providers. The real problem for
a provider is a lapsed agreement or a missing signature that goes undiscovered for years, potentially racking up huge CMP and FCA penalties. Some have argued for a new Stark exception for procedural
violations as a means of mitigating Stark’s harshness in this regard,100
but CMS does not seem to be considering any such exception.
G.

CMS’s Authority to Settle Cases

Prior to the enactment of the ACA, CMS had little or no authority
to compromise or waive any claims liability under Stark or other statutes.101 Thus, “prosecutorial discretion” was simply not available.
OIG, by contrast, did not have this limitation. When OIG announced
that it would no longer take Stark-only disclosures so that it could
96
Alternative Method for Compliance with Signature Requirements in Certain Exceptions, 73 Fed. Reg. 48,705 (Aug. 19, 2008) (codified at 42 C.F.R. §
411.353(g)).
97
Medicare Program; Proposed Revisions to Payment Policies under the
Physician Fee Schedule, and Other Part B Payment Policies for CY 2008, 72 Fed.
Reg. at 38,185.
98
Alternative Method for Compliance with Signature Requirements in Certain Exceptions, 73 Fed. Reg. at 48,706.
99
Id.
100
See Lower & Stone, supra note 52 (proposing a Technical Deficiency
Exception to Stark; WHITE PAPER, supra note 38, at 15 (suggesting a Technical Violation Exception).
101
Prior to PPACA, 42 C.F.R. § 405.376 did not include Stark claims among
those that could be compromised by CMS. 42 C.F.R. § 405.376(d) (2010).
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focus on criminal activity under other statutes, providers lost their best
avenue for negotiating settlements. However, as noted above, this
situation was remedied by the ACA’s explicit grant of authority to
CMS to compromise on penalty amounts in Stark cases,102 creating
significant opportunities for improving the administration of the Stark
Law, as will be discussed below.103
II.

THE SELF-DISCLOSURE PROTOCOL
A.

Providers’ Legal Obligation to Self-Disclose

When a provider discovers a Stark violation that has resulted in
overpayments (as defined by FERA and the FCA), the clock begins
ticking on the provider’s obligation to report and return the overpayment to the government within sixty days.104 An overpayment retained past the deadline is an “obligation” for purposes of the reverse
false claims provision of the FCA.105 Self-disclosure under SRDP tolls
the sixty-day requirement.106 Also, a provider may be eligible for a
reduction in penalties if the overpayment is self-reported rather than
discovered by the government in some other manner.107
A protocol has been in place since 1998 for self-disclosure of issues related to Stark and the Anti-Kickback Statute.108 The OIG SelfDisclosure Protocol (SDP) is based on a Department of Defense selfdisclosure program from the 1980s.109 The SDP requires that the provider describe the problem, including the scope and results of its internal investigation, an assessment of the financial impact on government health programs, and an explanation of the likely cause of the
problem.110 The SDP is administered by the OIG, which has jurisdiction over actions arising under the Anti-Kickback Statute.

102

Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111–148, §
6409(b), 124 Stat. 119, 772 (2010) (to be codified at 42. U.S.C. § 1395nn note).
103
See infra Part III.
104
PPACA § 6402(a), 124 Stat. at 755.
105
See False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. § 3729(b)(3) (Supp. III 2010).
106
SRDP, supra note 9, at 1.
107
Id.
108
See Publication of the OIG’s Provider Self- Disclosure Protocol, 63 Fed.
Reg. 58,399, 58,399 (Oct. 30, 1998) [hereinafter OIG’s Provider Self-Disclosure
Protocol].
109
See generally INSPECTOR GEN., DEP’T OF DEF., THE DEPARTMENT OF
DEFENSE VOLUNTARY DISCLOSURE PROGRAM (Apr. 1990) [hereinafter DEPARTMENT
OF
DEFENSE
VOLUNTARY
DISCLOSURE
PROGRAM],
available
at
http://www.dodig.mil/iginformation/archives/vdguidelines.pdf.
110
Id. at 6, 12.
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Originally, providers were expected to report Stark violations using the OIG SDP. However, in 2009, due to the large volume of disclosures it was receiving and its limited resources to process the disclosures, the OIG decided to focus on the more serious Anti-Kickback
Statute situations and stop accepting disclosures of Stark-only violations.111 As a result, providers complained about the lack of good
options for Stark-only self-disclosures. Congress responded with the
ACA provision requiring CMS to develop a protocol.112
B.

Self-Referral Disclosure Protocol Basics

The SRDP provides that the disclosure must identify the disclosing provider113 and describe the issue being disclosed, including the
type of transaction or conduct giving rise to the issue; entities and/or
individuals implicated and an explanation of their roles; financial relationship(s) involved, including specific periods during which the provider may have been out of compliance; any applicable date(s) by
which the conduct was cured; and any type of designated health service claims involved.114
The disclosure must also include a complete legal analysis as to
why the disclosing party believes a violation of the Stark law may
have occurred; the application of Stark to the conduct, including any
exceptions that may apply to the conduct; a description of the potential causes of the incident;115 the circumstances surrounding the discovery of the matter and measures taken to address the issue and prevent future abuses;116 and a statement concerning any history of similar conduct, or any prior criminal, civil and regulatory enforcement
actions against the disclosing provider.117
The provider must describe the existence and adequacy of a preexisting compliance program and all actions taken to prevent a recurrence of the incident or practice, including any measures taken to restructure the noncompliant relationship or arrangement.118 The pro111
Open Letter from Daniel R. Levinson, Inspector Gen., Dep’t of Health &
Human Serv’s, to Health Care Providers, OFF. OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF
HEALTH
&
HUMAN
SERV’S
(Mar.
24,
2009),
http://oig.hhs.gov/fraud/docs/openletters/OpenLetter3-24-09.pdf.
112
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 6409,
124 Stat. 119, 772-73 (2010) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn note).
113
SRDP, supra note 9, at 3.
114
Id. at 4.
115
Id.
116
Id.
117
Id.
118
Id.
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vider must also describe any other federal health-care program investigations to which the provider is currently subject, including any
other disclosures made by the provider to other government entities.119
The provider must also set out a full financial analysis, including
a total amount, itemized by year, that is actually or potentially owed,
back to the date of the initial noncompliance (or “look-back period”),120 along with an explanation of the methodology used to calculate the amount.121 The SRDP requires that the provider include in the
financial analysis the total amount of remuneration the physician(s)
received as a result of an actual or potential violation, based on the
applicable “look-back period”.122 Finally, the provider must include a
certification of the truthfulness of the information, based on a good
faith effort to resolve the disclosed potential liabilities under Stark.123
After receiving the disclosure, CMS verifies the facts asserted in
the disclosure.124 The extent of CMS’s verification effort depends, in
large part, upon the quality and thoroughness of the submission received.125 Matters uncovered during the verification process, which
are outside the scope of the matter disclosed to CMS, may be treated
as new matters outside the scope of the SRDP and thus proper subjects for governmental investigation and possible prosecution.126
Generally, CMS will not request information subject to the attorney-client privilege.127 If there are documents that may be covered by
the attorney work-product doctrine, but which CMS believes are critical to resolving the disclosure, CMS says it is prepared to work with
the disclosing party’s counsel to gain access to the underlying information without waiving privilege.128
Before any repayment is made, the disclosing party must acknowledge in writing that CMS’s acceptance of the payment is not an
agreement as to the amount of losses suffered by the government, and
“does not relieve the disclosing party of any criminal, civil, or civil
monetary penalty, nor does it offer a defense to any further administrative, civil, or criminal actions against the disclosing party.”129
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The disclosing party must exhibit good faith and full cooperation
with CMS during the disclosure process.130 This cooperation includes
the provision of documents and materials without CMS having to
resort to “compulsory methods.”131 CMS will consider a lack of
good-faith cooperation on the part of the provider when it determines
the appropriate resolution of the matter.132 The intentional submission
of false information, or the intentional omission of relevant information, will be referred to the DOJ or other appropriate federal agencies
and may result in additional criminal and/or civil sanctions and exclusion from participation in federal health-care programs.133
CMS is not bound by any conclusions made by the disclosing
party under the SRDP.134 Furthermore, it is not obligated to resolve
the matter disclosed in any particular manner and has no obligation to
reduce any amounts owed.135 A disclosing provider has no right of
appeal for matters resolved through a settlement agreement.136 If a
provider’s SRDP submission is denied acceptance, is removed, or
withdrawn, the provider may appeal any overpayment demand letter.137 However, CMS reserves the right to reopen any Medicare cost
reports filed since the initial disclosure of Stark violations.138
C.

Revisions of the SRDP

Since the initial release of the SRDP, CMS has received informal
comments from providers and attorneys regarding unclear provisions.
Agency representatives have informally commented that they learned
about some items that needed clarification after reviewing the first
SRDP submissions.139 In May 2011, CMS released the latest version
of the SRDP. This version specified that all physician fees related to a
noncompliant arrangement needed to be calculated as part of the disclosing provider’s financial analysis.140 More recently, Lewis Morris,
130
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(June
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2011),
http://www.modernhealthcare.com/article/20110629/NEWS/306299963/ (“We’re in a
learning process.” (quoting Troy Barsky, Director, CMS Technical Payment Policy
Division, speaking at the 2011 AHLA annual meeting)).
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Chief Counsel at OIG, announced that the agency is preparing to release additional guidance regarding self-disclosure, although it has not
announced specifically what that guidance will cover.141 However,
there is no indication that CMS is considering the type of significant
changes to the SRDP proposed in this Article.
D.

Results of the SRDP to Date

The ACA included a provision requiring CMS to report to Congress regarding disclosures by March 2012.142 The report will include
the number of health-care providers or suppliers making disclosures,
the dollar amounts collected, and the types of violations reported.143
CMS representatives have described some of the disclosures to date in
very general terms, but have not issued any summaries in writing.144
OIG’s website provides information about its settlements, such as the
general nature of the issue and the amount of the settlement.145 Presumably, CMS’s upcoming report to Congress will include similar
information.
One hospital has been willing to publicly discuss the results of its
self-disclosure to CMS. The settlement occurred prior to the release
of the revised SRDP, but it at least provides some guidance as to how
CMS conducts negotiations in these matters and on what terms it will
settle.146 That case involved Saints Medical Center in Lowell, Massachusetts. The settlement was for $579,000, an amount lower than the
hospital’s attorneys’ lowest estimate of potential obligation.147 Attorneys for the hospital said that they had not been given the opportunity
141
Gregg Blesch, Lawyer Warns on Overpayment Disclosures, MODERN
HEALTHCARE
(June
27,
2011),
http://www.modernhealthcare.com/article/20110627/NEWS/306279945/. Mr. Morris
was co-addressing a meeting of in-house counsel assembled for the American Health
Lawyers Association annual meeting with Robert Homchick, partner, Davis Wright
Tremaine LLP.
142
See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. no. 111–148, §
6409(c), 124 Stat. 119, 773 (2010) (to be codified 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn note).
143
Id.
144
Kass et al., supra note 12, at 29:45 (discussing the Saints Medical Center
settlement).
145
Selected Provider Self-disclosure Protocol Settlements, OFF. OF THE
INSPECTOR
GEN.,
U.S.
DEP’T
OF
HEALTH
&
HUMAN
SERV’S,
http://www.oig.hhs.gov/fraud/enforcement/cmp/self_disclosure.asp (last visited July
31, 2011).
146
See Press Release, Saints Medical Center, Saints Medical Center Resolves
Medicare Billing Compliance Issue (Feb. 10, 2011) [hereinafter Saints Press Release],
available at http://www.saintsmedicalcenter.com/news/CMS/.
147
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to negotiate the settlement at all; nonetheless, they were pleased with
the amount in light of potential penalties.148
III.

THE HONEY AND THE VINEGAR: INCENTIVES AND
DISINCENTIVES TO DISCLOSURE IN THE SRDP
A.

Importance of Incentives in a Decision to Disclose

CMS’s position on the SRDP seems to be that since the law requires self-disclosure, the agency does not need the “honey” of positive incentives to self-disclose.149 However, the dearth of disclosures
to date, compared to the multitude of potential issues requiring disclosure,150 indicates that a legal requirement to disclose is simply not
enough to make providers do the right thing. Most providers will not
state for the record whether and why they have decided not to disclose
issues which they are legally required to disclose. Some attorneys
report that clients are waiting to see how CMS administers the protocol before they decide whether to use it.151 In other cases, providers
simply do not believe that the benefits of disclosure outweigh the
risks. Attorneys report that their clients “tend to lean toward crossing
their fingers and hoping no one finds out rather than opening their
books to the government and inviting a certain financial consequence
in exchange for possible leniency.”152
We can gain some insight into the reasoning of these providers by
analyzing data and comments by health-care attorneys responding to a
2008 AHLA survey on the OIG self-disclosure protocol.153 Although
the survey deals with a different protocol and predates the ACA’s
148
Kass et al., supra note 12, at 23:35 (discussing disclosure by Saints’ attorney Christine Savage).
149
Video News: Live@AHLA 2011 Interview with OIG Chief Counsel Lewis
Morris,
MODERN
HEALTHCARE
(June
27,
2011,
5:00
PM),
http://www.modernhealthcare.com/article/20110627/VIDEO/306279890. Mr. Morris
comments on PPACA, specifying that the law provides an “affirmative statutory
obligation to repay money that does not belong to the provider.” Id.
150
See supra notes 12-14 and accompanying text.
151
Lauer & Roth, supra note 11; see Jason Christ et al., CMS Opens its Doors
by Creating the Stark Voluntary Self-Referral Disclosure Protocol—But Enter at Your
Own Risk, 19 HEALTH LAW REP. (BNA) 1400 (2010) (concluding that given uncertainty regarding a number of SRDP provisions, some providers may elect to wait
before evaluating the merits of the protocol until after CMS responds to initial disclosures in its March 2012 report to Congress).
152
Blesch, supra note 141 (discussing comments by Robert Homchick).
153
2007-08 Voluntary Disclosure Survey, ZOOMERANG.COM [hereinafter
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Disclosure
Survey],
http://www.zoomerang.com/Shared/SharedResultsSurveyResultsPage.aspx?ID=L235
XLG2T5DX (last visited Oct. 29, 2011) (complete survey results).
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requirement to self-disclose violations, it offers some helpful glimpses
into the advantages and disadvantages of self-disclosure from the provider’s perspective.
The survey asked AHLA members to describe their experience
with the then-new OIG SDP.154 One hundred ninety-five attorneys
responded. Most of the disclosures related to billing or coding errors,
but 28 percent related to either Anti-Kickback or Stark disclosures.155
In approximately 46 percent of the cases in which respondents selfdisclosed, the government settled for a simple repayment of the overpayment in question.156 In 18 percent, the government negotiated an
amount to be repaid plus simple interest, while 22 percent negotiated
settlements but were not required to pay interest.157 Six percent involved some type of regulatory penalty, while 7 percent resulted in a
civil monetary penalty or other administrative monetary sanction for
individuals or the company.158 In 8 percent of the cases, there was an
FCA settlement with a multiplier of the overpayment.159 Twelve percent of the cases resulted in a corporate integrity agreement.160
The survey did not ask what factors were most important in persuading the provider to self-disclose. However, the open-ended response section of the survey provided a platform for candid comments
on the advantages and disadvantages of self-disclosure from the provider’s point of view. For example, one attorney said, “[m]y clients
have consistently chosen not to make voluntary disclosures.”161 Another stated that, “[i]n the few instances where voluntary disclosure
was discussed with the client, the decision was made not to voluntarily disclose because the medical practice did not have all of its compliance ducks in a row and was worried about what else the government might uncover if they came onsite to investigate.”162 One respondent cautioned:
The FI’s (fiscal intermediary’s) fraud unit and the OIG
eventually got involved and demonstrated a real inability to understand the provider’s side of the issue.
154
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160
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Eventually, the AUSA [Associate U.S. Attorney] and
OIG forced an interest payment that was absolutely incorrect and unjust, on top of a two times False Claims
Act settlement. The entire experience removed any illusion that the federal government is interested in fairness.163
Some of the providers reported positive experiences with selfdisclosure. “The process worked very well for us. The OIG rep
worked with us for a fair resolution and noted our cooperative nature
and self-disclosure. She accepted our proposed exposure and waived
any interest or fines.”164 Other commenters echoed that sentiment,165
stating that the attorney found the process “fair and balanced, unlike
the early reports of overkill in the last decade of the 20th century. If
credible, experienced resources are used and the disclosure is professionally prepared and handled, the result is often satisfactory for both
provider and enforcer.”166
B.

Incentives to Disclosure under the SRDP

Providers clearly weigh the honey and vinegar of self-disclosure
when deciding whether to proceed. Therefore, one must identify the
reasons providers would choose to disclose or not. The most obvious
reason to disclose a Stark violation is that it is required by the ACA
and other statutes.167 If the requirement alone were enough to motivate providers, CMS would have far more disclosures than the seventy or so it has received to date. This Article’s main thesis is that
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Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111–148, §
6402(a), 124 Stat. 119, 755 (2010) (to be codified 42 U.S.C. § 1330a-7k(d)(1)); see
also 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn(g)(2) (2006) (“If a person collects any amounts . . . billed in
violation of [Stark] . . . , the person shall be liable to the individual for, and shall
refund on a timely basis . . . amounts [] collected.”); 42 C.F.R. § 411.353(d) (2010)
(an entity collecting payments for services provided pursuant to a Stark violation
“must refund [payments] on a timely basis”); False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. §
3729(a)(1)(G) (Supp. III 2010) (stating that an entity that “knowingly conceals or
knowingly and improperly avoids or decreases an obligation to pay or transmit money
or property to the Government” is subject to False Claim liability).
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many other factors besides the legal requirement determine the behavior of providers. If providers were primarily focused on the legal requirement, there would be far fewer compliance issues to disclose in
the first place, since they would not have allowed any other consideration to trump their need to obey the Stark Law.
The SRDP states that while CMS is not obligated to reduce any
amounts owed as a result of a Stark violation, it will consider doing so
based on the facts and circumstances of each actual or potential violation disclosed.168 In the only Stark disclosure to CMS that has been
made public to date, it does appear that the hospital received a substantial discount in the settlement from the amount that it might have
owed in a worst-case scenario.169 As previously mentioned, that case
involved Saints Hospital in Massachusetts. The hospital’s attorneys
stated for the annual audit that liability could be as much as $14 million, but the penalty in that case was only $579,000.170 Since CMS
did not provide any rationale for the final penalty, providers have not
learned a great deal about what CMS’s position is likely to be in other
cases.
The SRDP further states that if CMS accepts a disclosure into the
protocol, the disclosure stops the “ticking of the clock” on the provider’s obligation to repay the overpayment.171 Thus, a provider can
avoid interest, and potentially some penalties, by making a disclosure.
CMS, however, is not bound to accept any conclusions by disclosing
parties and is not obligated to resolve the matter in any particular
manner.172
While there are no criminal penalties for Stark violations, a provider may nonetheless view creating prosecutorial goodwill as a valuable outcome of a Stark self-disclosure. The SRDP itself notes that a
prosecutor will not pursue a criminal action against a provider that
voluntarily discloses noncompliance, especially when the provider has
cooperated fully, taken any necessary personnel actions, and taken
action to assure the problem will not recur.173 As Silver and Wisner
point out:

168

SRDP, supra note 9, at 6.
See Saints Press Release, supra note 146.
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Kass et al., supra note 12, at 35:00, 34:45 (discussing Saints Medical
disclosure by Saints’ attorney Christine Savage).
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172
Id. at 2.
173
AM. HEALTH LAWYERS ASS’N, HEALTHCARE COMPLIANCE LEGAL ISSUES
MANUAL 106 (Harry R. Silver & Cynthia F. Wisner eds., 3d ed. 2011) [hereinafter
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Additional benefits of self-disclosure include the ability to more fully frame the issues, complete a thorough
internal investigation, develop an improved and lessadversarial relationship with law enforcement officials,
and demonstrate that the organization is ready and
willing to act responsibly. In addition, providers and
entities that voluntarily disclose may reduce the likelihood of receiving subpoenas or search warrants.174
Another benefit of self-disclosure is possible avoidance of a corporate integrity agreement (CIA). In situations where the government
is concerned about a recurring compliance issue, the agency involved
often insists upon a CIA as a part of any settlement. Such agreements
impose continuing investigative and reporting obligations on providers, sometimes for a number of years. The OIG routinely negotiates
CIAs with health-care providers and other entities as part of the settlement of federal health-care program investigations arising under a
variety of civil false claims statutes.175 Providers or other entities
agree to the obligations, and, in exchange, the OIG agrees not to exclude them from participation in Medicare, Medicaid, or other federal
health-care programs.176
According to the OIG, “CIAs have many common elements, but
each one addresses the specific facts at issue and often attempts to
accommodate and recognize many of the elements of preexisting voluntary compliance programs.”177 The OIG states further that a typical
CIA lasts five years, and includes the following requirements:
•
•
•
•
•
•

174

a compliance officer and compliance committee;
written standards and policies;
a comprehensive employee training program;
annual reviews by an independent review organization;
a hotline or similar confidential disclosure program;
a program to prevent employment of persons with
a history of compliance issues;
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reports of overpayments and other compliance issues as they arise; and
annual reports to OIG on the status of the entity’s
compliance program.178

Aside from avoidance of a CIA, a provider might seek to establish
that it has a good compliance program by self-disclosing a Stark violation. The United States Sentencing Guidelines (Guidelines) provide
significant incentives for self-disclosure in the form of reduced criminal penalties. The Guidelines give a provider credit for an “effective”
compliance plan.179 An effective compliance and ethics program is
one which demonstrates that the organization “exercise[s] due diligence to prevent and detect criminal conduct,” and “otherwise promote[s] an organizational culture that encourages ethical conduct and
a commitment to compliance with the law.”180 The Guidelines specify
that the program should be “generally effective,” but “failure to prevent or detect . . . [an] offense does not necessarily mean that the program is not generally effective.”181 Thus, providers hope that by disclosing a compliance issue, they will demonstrate the effectiveness of
their compliance program, and reap benefits in the event of future
investigations.
Self-disclosure also allows a provider to frame the issues and thus
minimize the impact of any whistleblower action under the FCA.182
As discussed above in Part I.D, qui tam actions are the major driver of
Stark enforcement. Any opportunity to cut off such suits is therefore
extremely valuable to a provider. However, as also noted above, that
ability may be limited if a voluntary disclosure does not foreclose a
qui tam action.183
C.

Disincentives to Disclosure in the SRDP

There are a number of reasons providers might choose to “roll the
dice” and risk investigation or prosecution rather than self-disclose
under the current version of the SRDP. The most of important are as
178
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An
effective compliance plan may potentially decrease an organization’s point values
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follows: (1) the difficulty in identifying an overpayment as required in
the protocol, (2) CMS’s resistance to settling claims for less than two
times the overpayment involved, (3) CMS’s failure to distinguish between procedural and substantive violations, (4) the short amount of
time within which a disclosure must be made, (5) the difficulty in
determining whether disclosure should be to CMS or another agency,
(6) the length of the “look-back” period, (7) the waiver of attorneyclient privilege, (8) the required statement about past conduct, (9) the
lack of appeal rights, and (10) implications for the provider’s compliance plan. Each of these issues is set out in detail below.
1.

Identification of an Overpayment

The term “identified” is not defined in the ACA, and so providers
may not always know whether they have met that threshold requirement for the repayment obligation.184 The SRDP does not define the
term either. It does require providers to explain to CMS “[t]he circumstances under which the disclosed matter was discovered and the
measures taken upon discovery to address the actual or potential violation and prevent future instances of noncompliance.”185 Furthermore, the SRDP requires that parties identify the “specific time periods the disclosing party may have been out of compliance (and if applicable, the dates or a range of dates whereby the conduct was cured)
. . . .”186
Former New York Medicaid Inspector General James Sheehan
once stated that it was his agency’s position that a call to a hospital’s
complaint hotline triggers the sixty-day period within which the provider must report an overpayment.187 However, providers point out
that they receive many unsubstantiated claims that, upon investigation, prove to be false. Therefore, they argue, no overpayment has
been identified until an alleged overpayment has been brought to the
attention of the correct person within the provider’s organization, investigated properly, and shown to actually be an overpayment.
The SRDP states that CMS will take into account the “timeliness
of the disclosure” in determining the appropriate penalty.188 It also
cautions that the extent of verification will depend on the quality and
thoroughness of the submission received. The disclosure must be
184
185
186
187

See e.g., Lauer & Roth, supra note 11, at 15-16.
SRDP, supra note 9, at 4.
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complete, and no further information should be submitted to augment
an initial disclosure after it is submitted to CMS.189 Therefore, providers must choose between submitting the disclosure as soon as possible and making sure it is complete enough to pass muster with CMS.
Recently, a CMS representative criticized the disclosures received
thus far under the SRDP, saying that the main problem is that providers are not giving CMS enough information when they do make a
disclosure.190 Providers must walk a difficult line between disclosing
quickly enough to be timely, but not so quickly as to be deemed incomplete.
2.

CMS’s Position on Financial Settlements

The congressional mandate in the ACA authorized, but did not require, CMS to reduce the penalties due under the Stark Law.191 Congress listed three factors that CMS should consider when assessing
penalties: (1) “[t]he nature and extent of the improper or illegal practice,” (2) “[t]he timeliness of the self-disclosure,” and (3) “cooperation in providing additional information related to the disclosure.”192
CMS added additional factors it would consider when it released the
SRDP: (4) the litigation risk associated with the matter disclosed, (5)
the amounts owed, (6) the financial position of the disclosing party,
and (7) other factors as the HHS Secretary deems appropriate.193
Unlike the OIG, CMS has not publicly announced its willingness
to decrease Stark penalties below the “face value” of the penalties
available. The OIG’s protocol states that, “subject to the facts and
circumstances of the case, [it] will generally settle SDP matters for . .
. a multiplier of the value of the financial benefit conferred by the
hospital upon the physician(s).”194 Thus, the OIG appears to focus on
improper financial benefit rather than the maximum penalty available
under the applicable law.
189
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Prior to the SRDP’s release, the American Hospital Association
(AHA) urged CMS to consider additional factors such as:
whether the parties’ failure to meet all the prescribed
criteria of an applicable exception was due to an innocent or unintentional mistake; the corrective action
taken by the parties; whether the services provided
were reasonable and medically necessary; whether access to a physician’s services was required in an emergency situation; whether the Medicare program suffered any harm beyond the statutory disallowance.195
While CMS’s “litigation risk” criteria might arguably include some of
the AHA’s suggested factors, CMS declined to openly embrace any of
the AHA factors. CMS did not offer any explanation as to why it
rejected these ideas.
CMS representatives have informally signaled their willingness to
reduce amounts owed in a recent AHLA webinar for health-care attorneys. In the webinar, the presenters representing the government
listed several “subfactors” that CMS considers in settlements: (1)
whether the arrangement was commercially reasonable and/or at fair
market value, (2) whether the arrangement took into account the volume or value of referrals, (3) whether there was a history of program
abuse, (4) whether the amount in question was set in advance, (5) the
presence and strength of a preexisting compliance program, (6) the
length and pervasiveness of the noncompliance, and (7) the steps
taken to correct the noncompliance.196 These factors have not been
released in any official pronouncement.197 Notably absent from the
list is any consideration of whether patients or the program actually
suffered any harm as a result of the arrangement and whether the violation resulted from an innocent mistake or so-called “technical” error.
Leaving aside those considerations, the SRDP does not specify
how CMS will determine the dollar amount of the claims made pursuant to a noncompliant financial relationship. Will it be based on the
number of patients admitted by the physician? Sometimes there are
multiple physicians involved in one admission. If Dr. House admits a
patient, but other physicians or providers, such as physical therapists
or medical equipment providers, also bill the government for services
195

AHA Letter, supra note 8, at 3.
Troy Barsky & Roy Albert, Ctr. for Medicare & Medicaid Services, Am.
Health Lawyers Ass’n Webinar Presentation, The New Reality of Stark SelfDisclosures: What to Do and Not Do, at 14 (Nov. 19, 2010) (on file with author).
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as a result of the initial hospital admission, will the value of those
products and services be considered part of the basis for the penalty?
For example, in the above-mentioned Saints Medical Center
case,198 CMS could base the government’s claim on the amounts
billed to the Medicare program for all services provided to all patients
treated by the physician involved in the noncompliant financial relationship. Clearly, CMS did not take that position, since the hospital’s
attorneys were very pleased with the settlement relative to what it
could have been. But we do not know what the basis was for CMS’s
calculation of the penalty, since it did not release that information.
The penalty might have been lowered because CMS decided the situation did not really harm the Medicare program, or because the physicians involved simply had not admitted many patients who cost the
Medicare program significant amounts of money. In other words, is
CMS discounting the value of its claim based on equitable factors that
it did not wish to specify either to the provider or to the public?
The OIG, in contrast to CMS, demonstrated its willingness to settle for less than the face value of the claim in several cases settled
prior to the OIG’s announcement that it would not accept “Stark-only”
settlements in the SDP. For instance, the failure of Cushing Memorial
Hospital in Leavenworth, Kansas to have a rental agreement with a
physician using space in the hospital’s medical office building resulted in a Stark violation.199 The OIG settled for $50,000, despite the
fact that the physician’s referrals had resulted in millions of dollars in
claims.200 The OIG could have insisted on repayment of all of those
claims and possibly even CMPs or penalties under the FCA that are a
multiplier of the amount of the claims.
In another case, Memorial Hospital of Union County in
Marysville, Ohio paid $31,000 in CMPs. The hospital had exceeded
by $3,000 the $355 Stark cap on nonmonetary compensation of physicians.201 The penalty would have been enormous if the OIG had focused on the value of referrals made by the physicians, rather than the
minimal financial benefit the hospital had actually conferred upon
those physicians. When these settlements were announced, an attorney representing a number of hospitals and physicians hailed the settlements as possible “cornerstone cases with respect to the application
of Stark and repayments. They show there is a substantial ability to
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200
Id. at 2.
201
Id.
199

HEALTH MATRIX

206

[Vol. 22:169]

negotiate a reasonable amount.”202 However, the OIG’s subsequent
closure of its program to Stark-only disclosures put an end to this
short-lived optimism in the provider community regarding Stark enforcement.203
The CMS disclosure protocol also contrasts with New York
State’s Medicaid self-disclosure program in terms of its willingness to
offer a reduction in penalties as a reward for self-disclosure. The New
York Office of the Medicaid Inspector General (OMIG) released its
Self-Disclosure Guidance in March 2009.204 The OMIG’s guidance
states that its program is aimed at encouraging providers to find problems within their own organization, reveal those issues to the OMIG,
and return inappropriate payments.205 The OMIG disclosure protocol
is written in general terms and includes all program integrity issues
rather than the specific statutes that the CMS and OIG protocols
cover.206 The OMIG disclosure protocol states that providers who
self-disclose overpayments will typically have a better outcome than
if the OMIG had discovered the matter independently.207 The specific
benefits to self-disclosure that the OMIG cites in its protocol include:
•
•
•
•
•
•

forgiveness or reduction of interest payments;
extended repayment terms;
waiver of penalties and/or sanctions;
recognition of the effectiveness of the provider’s
compliance program;
a decrease in the likelihood of imposition of an
OMIG Corporate Integrity Program; and
possible preclusion of subsequently filed New
York State False Claims Act qui tam actions based
on the disclosed matters. 208

202
Id. (discussing attorney Robert Wade’s comments regarding OIG’s willingness to set lower CMPs for hospitals who voluntarily disclose alleged Stark violations).
203
See Open Letter from Daniel R. Levinson, supra note 111.
204
STATE OF N.Y. OFFICE OF THE MEDICAID INSPECTOR GEN., SELFDISCLOSURE GUIDANCE (Mar. 12, 2009) [hereinafter N.Y. SELF-DISCLOSURE
GUIDANCE],
http://www.omig.state.ny.us/data/images/stories/self_disclosure/omig_provider_self_
disclosure_guidance.pdf.
205
Id. at 1.
206
Id. at 3. Disclosures may include substantial routine errors and patterns of
errors, as well as issues implicating potential violations of fraud and abuse laws.
207
Id. at 2.
208
Id.
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Failure to Distinguish Between Procedural
and Substantive Violations

While many of the disadvantages of using the SRDP apply to all
SRDP disclosures, the disadvantages are particularly acute when the
underlying violation of the law is procedural rather than substantive.
As discussed above, CMS considered and ultimately rejected any distinction between procedural and substantive violations in the Stark
regulations themselves, except the very narrow exception provided for
missing signatures.209
The SRDP does not make any distinction between minor violations that do not affect the integrity of government health-care programs and violations that go to the heart of why the legislation was
enacted. Presumably, a procedural violation would fare well in consideration of the “nature and extent of the improper or illegal practice,”210 but CMS has not said so directly. Attorneys Katherine Lauer
and Robert Roth, speaking to an AHLA webinar audience in June
2011, stated that they had heard that CMS may be considering referring matters that are not simply “technical” issues to the OIG.211 That
would leave only the technical or procedural issues to be dealt with
under the SRDP. If CMS were to remove all substantive issues from
the SRDP, it would only serve to sharpen providers’ complaints that
the SRDP as currently structured is unnecessarily punitive and unfair
to providers who have simply failed to sign an agreement or have allowed a signed agreement to lapse.
4.

Deadline for Disclosure

The SRDP requires the disclosing provider to act quickly, yet
quite comprehensively. Some practitioners have stated that the sixtyday requirement for repayment of overpayments under the ACA
means that providers must disclose within sixty days to be able to take
advantage of the SRDP.212 As some attorneys have noted:
Sixty days is a short time frame to conduct a thorough
internal review of potential noncompliance, come to
conclusions about whether a violation has occurred,
assemble descriptions of the potential causes of the incident or practice at issue, draft descriptions of any
209
210
211
212

See supra Part I.E.
SRDP, supra note 9, at 6.
Lauer & Roth, supra note 11, at 25.
Christ et al., supra note 151.
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similar conduct and of the compliance program, design
remedial actions and describe them, conduct an accurate financial analysis of the potential repayment and
present all these materials to the compliance committee and/or governing body for review/approval for filing with CMS. The timetable for this process raises
serious questions as to whether the SRDP process is a
meaningful opportunity for providers to resolve significant or complex legal areas of potential noncompliance.213
The information that must be provided in that short amount of
time is actually more comprehensive and definitive than that required
in the OIG SDP. The SDP allows the provider to conduct its internal
review after the initial disclosure to the government. The OIG agrees
not to investigate on its own while the provider conducts its internal
review, according to the OIG’s guidelines as laid out in the SDP.214
The CMS SRDP has no similar process for allowing incremental
submission of information by providers. In fact, under the SRDP, the
provider must conduct a “complete legal analysis,” including identification of the specific requirements of all exceptions under Stark and
explanations as to why the organization fails to meet them.215 Presumably, a disclosure needs to include a legal memorandum by an
attorney in order to fulfill this requirement.
If CMS determines that the information given by the provider is not
sufficient, CMS may decide not to accept a disclosure into the SRDP.
Attorney Robert Wade represents five providers who applied to resolve Stark problems through the SRDP. He reported that in two
cases, CMS accepted the submissions but asked for more documentation before it accepted the submissions; in two other cases, CMS
asked for additional information, but has not yet notified as to whether
it will accept the submissions. CMS has not yet responded to the fifth
disclosure.216

213

Id.
OIG’s Provider Self-Disclosure Protocol, supra note 108, at 58,401.
215
SRDP, supra note 9, at 4.
216
Nina Youngstrom, First Stark Case is Resolved Through CMS SelfDisclosure; is the OIG Option Gone?, REP. ON MEDICARE COMPLIANCE, Feb. 2011, at
2.
214
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Determining To Which Agency Disclosure Is
Best Made

The SRDP states that parties should not disclose the same behavior to both the OIG and CMS.217 Due to the fact that most situations
that raise Stark issues also raise Anti-Kickback issues, providers often
face a dilemma when deciding which disclosure protocol to use. Providers conceivably prefer to use the “Stark-only” SRDP when possible, rather than admit that they may have violated the criminal AntiKickback statute, which requires the OIG SDP. Another advantage to
using the SRDP is that CMS has the authority to release providers
from Stark liability,218 whereas the OIG does not.
Despite these advantages, providers often prefer to disclose that
there is a colorable Anti-Kickback claim so that they can work with
the OIG rather than the CMS. In the words of one attorney who advises health-care providers, the OIG’s “clear guidance and reasoned
approach to penalty determination” makes disclosure to the OIG preferable to disclosure to CMS.219 Also, if a provider decides to go the
Stark-only route and discloses to CMS, the agency may refer the matter to the OIG or DOJ if it decides during the course of its investigation that there is a colorable Anti-Kickback claim.220 Indeed, the
SRDP warns that CMS may use material in the disclosure itself as
evidence against the provider in its decision to make a referral to the
OIG or DOJ.221 In that situation, the provider will not have the opportunity for any leniency under the OIG SDP. So, providers would do
well to heed CMS’s advice in the SRDP that “the disclosing party’s
initial decision of where to disclose a matter . . . should be made carefully.”222

217

SRDP, supra note 9, at 2.
See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111–148, §
6409(b), 124 Stat. 119, 772 (2010) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn note).
219
Larry C. Conn, Navigating CMS’ Channel for Stark Disclosures, J.
HEALTH CARE COMPLIANCE, Jan.–Feb. 2011, at 25, 28; see also Michelle C. Gabriel
McGovern, Medicare Physician Self-Referral Disclosure Protocol: Will the Truth Set
You Free?, J. HEALTH CARE COMPLIANCE, Jan.-Feb. 2011, at 59, 60 (comparing the
OIG and CMS disclosure protocols and concluding that absent further clarification by
CMS, its SRDP offers no significant additional benefits to disclosing providers).
220
SRDP, supra note 9, at 2-3.
221
Id. at 3.
222
Id.
218
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The “Look-Back” Period

One of the most significant issues for self-disclosing providers is
the length of time CMS will “look-back” from the date of the disclosure to determine the extent of the illegal conduct. The “look-back”
period is a major determinant of the total overpayment and penalties
that will be due. Many of the financial relationships between hospitals and physicians, such as departmental directorships, can extend for
decades, creating a major problem for an entity seeking closure on a
lapsed contract, for example.
The SRDP requires a disclosing party to state the total amount
that is actually or potentially owed based on the applicable “lookback” period.223 The SRDP defines the “look-back” period as the
length of the time during which the disclosing party may not have
been in compliance with the provider self-referral law.224 When the
protocol was first published, many commentators raised concerns
regarding the open-ended nature of this definition.225 The definition
conceivably extends the “look-back” period beyond that for which the
provider would be liable if the government learned of the conduct
through means other than self-disclosure.
Normally, HHS may reopen a hospital’s filed claims for up to
four years from the date of the initial determination or redetermination
when “good cause” to reopen the claim exists. 226 Good cause is said
to exist when there is:
new and material evidence that was not available or
known at the time of the determination or decision and
may result in a different conclusion; or [t]he evidence
that was considered in making the determination or
decision clearly shows on its face that an obvious error

223

Id. at 5.
Id.
225
See Goel & Melvin, supra note 57 (recognizing that although the SRDP
refers to regulatory time limitations on look-back periods, neither the protocol nor
CMS has indicated how they may be applied in a self-disclosure); see also Youngstrom, supra note 216, at 2 (a provider’s documentation of an entire look-back period
can be “fairly extensive . . . and can be burdensome,” quoting attorney Kevin McAnaney, former chief OIG’s Industry Guidance Branch).
226
42 C.F.R. § 405.980(b)(2) (2010). The government may reopen a claim at
any time if “reliable evidence,” as defined in 42 C.F.R. § 405.902, exists that the
initial determination was procured by fraud. Presumably that section would not apply
in most “pure Stark” cases, particularly in those cases involving only procedural
violations of the statute. Id.
224
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was made at the time of the determination or decision.227
Even in the most serious of Stark violations where the FCA is implicated, the statute of limitations is six years.228
Thus, the effect of CMS’s look-back period is to extend what
would otherwise be a shorter statute of limitations. CMS representatives recently stated that the agency did indeed intend to create an
open-ended look-back period for the SRDP.229 Thus, self-disclosure
under the SRDP potentially exposes the provider to more liability than
would be allowable under law in the event the noncompliance was
discovered by the government in some manner other than selfdisclosure. In contrast, the New York OMIG takes an alternative approach, providing a clear six-year “look-back” period with limited
exceptions.230
7.

Waiver of Attorney Client Privilege

Once a provider enters into the SRDP, the provider must provide
CMS “access to all financial statements, notes, disclosures, and other
supporting documents without the assertion of privileges or limitations. . . .”231 Although CMS has specified that it will not request
written material that is subject to attorney-client privilege, it also
states that if there are documents or other materials which it believes
are critical, it will discuss with a disclosing party’s counsel “ways to
gain access to the underlying information without waiver of protections provided by an appropriately asserted claim of privilege.”232
Providers remain concerned that a self-disclosure might result in
waiving the privilege.233
227

CMS, MEDICARE CLAIMS PROCESSING MANUAL: CHAPTER 34 - AEOPENING
REVISION OF CLAIM DETERMINATIONS AND DECISIONS §10.11 (revised June 17,
2011), available at https://www.cms.gov/manuals/downloads/ clm104c34.pdf.
228
False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. § 3731(b)(1) (2006).
229
Carlson, supra note 130 (“The CMS will request to see the entire amount
of questionable remuneration, regardless of any statute of limitations that would apply
in a court process.”).
230
Sheehan & Hussar, supra note 19, at 31 (“OMIG will not require or expect providers to look-back more than six years from the date of disclosure unless the
disclosure involves a base year cost report, or OMIG determines that there is a basis
to suspect fraud.”).
231
SRDP, supra note 9, at 5.
232
Id.
233
See Christ et al., supra note 151 (concluding the potential waiver of privilege is an uncertainty in the SRDP process which is a “critically important consideration that disclosing parties should weigh carefully”); Conn, supra note 219, at 69
AND
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Statement Regarding Past Conduct

The SRDP requires participants to include a statement “identifying whether the disclosing party has a history of similar conduct or
has any prior criminal, civil and regulatory enforcement actions
against it.”234 There doesn’t appear to be any time limitation on this
requirement. The phrase “a history of similar conduct” is quite ambiguous. Does “similar” refer to a specific type of issue, such as failure to obtain a signature, or does it consider all the facts and circumstances of the particular disclosure? For example, consider again Dr.
House’s failure to sign his agreement that otherwise complied with a
Stark exception. If neither party noticed the lack of a signature for
five years, is that “similar” to a future situation in which the hospital
failed to obtain a signature but discovered it after five weeks? Suppose that in the first instance, the hospital had a change of personnel
and the department head responsible for the agreement left the hospital. By the time of the second incident, the hospital had implemented
a new contract management system, and that system caught the lack
of a signature. Clearly, the hospital’s overall compliance program had
improved significantly between the two incidents, and yet CMS may
consider the two situations “similar” and expect disclosure of the second incident even though it meets the SRDP exception for selfcorrection of a missing signature.235
The requirement for determining whether the hospital has had a
“similar” situation exacerbates the time pressure on providers who
need to compare different situations before making a conclusion about
their similarity. The OIG SDP allows providers to supply additional
information after the initial disclosure,236 which gives the provider a
chance to amend any initial statements about the provider’s historical
compliance if its investigation uncovers a previously unrecognized
pattern of similar conduct. The SRDP does not allow amendment
after submission.

(“CMS may insist on review of materials that may be covered by the work product
doctrine.”).
234
See supra note 9, at 4.
235
See supra Part I.F.
236
See N.Y. SELF-DISCLOSURE GUIDANCE, supra note 204, at 4.
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Lack of Appeal Rights

There is no right of appeal from a voluntary settlement agreement
with CMS resolving a self-disclosed violation.237 By contrast, if a
provider’s compliance issues were discovered in an investigation or
through some other means, the provider would have full rights to appeal any administrative penalty or court decision unless the provider
waived those rights in a settlement. The SRDP does state that if an
entity does not satisfactorily resolve the issue with CMS through the
protocol and ultimately withdraws from the process, CMS has the
authority to issue overpayment determinations based on the information it gained from the self-disclosure. The provider would then be
able to appeal those determinations through the normal administrative
processes.238 So, providers have at least some leverage on this point,
since they can simply threaten to walk away from the self-disclosure
resolution process if they are concerned that CMS will not reach an
acceptable conclusion. If they choose this option, CMS will likely
turn the matter over to the OIG or the DOJ for investigation and
prosecution.239
Of course, the outcome may not always be readily apparent. In
the Saints Medical Center disclosure discussed in Part III.B, the hospital’s counsel reported that they had no idea how CMS came to the
settlement amount it did.240 While Saints’ counsel was pleased with
the settlement, had they not been, they would have had to choose to
roll the dice on an appeal after investing significant time and money in
the self-disclosure process.
10.

Implications for the Provider’s Compliance
Plan

Finally, it is unclear what the implications of self-disclosure are
for the provider’s compliance plan. The SRDP requires providers to
supply “a description of the potential causes of the incident or practice
(e.g., intentional conduct, lack of internal controls, circumvention of
corporate procedures or Government regulations).”241 It goes on to
state that the provider must also supply:
237

SRDP, supra note 9, at 2.
Id.
239
Id. at 2-3, 6 (discussing cooperation between CMS, OIG, and the DOJ
when considering a provider’s “lack of cooperation” in determining an “appropriate
resolution to the [disclosed] matter”).
240
Kass et al., supra note 12, at 37:54 (discussing Saints Medical disclosure
by Saints’ attorney Christine Savage).
241
SRDP, supra note 9, at 4.
238

HEALTH MATRIX

214

[Vol. 22:169]

[a] description of the existence and adequacy of a preexisting compliance program that the disclosing party
had, and all efforts by the disclosing party to prevent a
recurrence of the incident or practice in the affected
division as well as in any related health care entities
(e.g., new accounting or internal control procedures,
new training programs, increased internal audit efforts,
increased supervision by higher management).242
In light of these requirements, providers question whether CMS
views a disclosure as evidence of the effectiveness or lack of effectiveness of a compliance plan. This ambiguity contrasts with the explicit statement of the New York OMIG that a disclosure will be taken
as evidence that the provider’s compliance plan is effective.243
IV.

A PROPOSAL FOR A DEMONSTRATION PROJECT TO TEST
MODIFICATIONS
A.

Benefits of a Demonstration Project

The central question raised in this Article is whether there are
changes that could be made to the SRDP to encourage providers to
disclose more violations, while also avoiding the risk of Medicare
program abuse by providers due to simpler procedures and less governmental scrutiny. Prior to the release of the current SRDP, other
authors suggested more provider-friendly procedures than were ultimately adopted by CMS.244 Since the agency did not explain why it
did not include any of these ideas in the SRDP, we can only guess as
to its reasons. Presumably, CMS was concerned that the integrity of
Medicare would be compromised if providers took undue advantage
of the flexibility or limited penalties embodied in these suggestions.
A demonstration project would offer an opportunity to test these ideas
without risking the integrity of the entire Medicare system. If any of
the ideas prove too fraught with difficulties in administration or result
in providers’ failing to fully and truthfully describe their situations in
disclosures, the risks to the Medicare program will have been limited
to the test region.
A more provider-friendly demonstration protocol offers an opportunity to gain several important insights. First, CMS would learn
whether providers would respond by significantly increasing the num242
243
244

Id.
N.Y. SELF-DISCLOSURE GUIDANCE, supra note 204, at 2.
See infra Part I.F.
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ber of disclosures and therefore the amount of money the government
recovers for the Medicare Trust Fund.245 Second, CMS would learn
which protocol provisions are most significant in provider selfdisclosure decisions. Third, CMS would learn a great deal about how
hospitals contract with physicians, including what provisions in those
contracts are typical of the industry as a whole, and which are more
unusual and possibly more problematic.
Finally, CMS would also learn about providers’ recordkeeping
practices and approaches to documentation of fair market value. CMS
has demonstrated its interest in this type of information. In 2008, the
agency launched a program to gather data on physicians’ relationships
with hospitals. Ultimately the program was halted because CMS determined that the ACA’s disclosure requirements may result in duplicative information. However, CMS stated that “[it] remain[s] interested in analyzing physicians’ compensation relationships.”246
If the information CMS gleaned from the project supported its
concerns about significant provider abuses, the agency could use the
information to craft better enforcement programs and tighter regulations, or to target particular industry segments where problems are
more rampant. CMS would gain a more accurate understanding of
which providers are likely to be engaged in significant misconduct.
If, on the other hand, the information gathered showed that current
Stark regulations are overly restrictive and ineffective at recovering
funds, the agency could relax Stark enforcement and shift the resources to other parts of the health-care industry or to other healthcare statutes. At a minimum, a more provider-friendly protocol with
simpler, faster resolution of issues would avoid the expense of complex investigations of and negotiations with providers whose violations are less serious. Instead, CMS could focus on more serious violators.
Providers in the demonstration project region could take advantage of lower costs of settlement and decreased risk of penalties, particularly for technical violations. The pilot program would make the
cost benefit analysis for self-disclosure less lopsided, so that doing the
right thing would not put a provider in financial or legal peril. If CMS
decided to use the results of the project to make the SRDP more provider-friendly, providers across the United States would reap the
benefits.
245
The Medicare Trust Fund collectively refers to the Federal Hospital Insurance Trust Fund (Medicare Part A) and the Federal Supplementary Medical Insurance
Trust Fund (Medicare Parts B and D). Costs for beneficiaries under these programs
are paid out of the Medicare Trust Fund. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395i, 1395t (2006).
246
See DFRR, supra note 15, and accompanying text.
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Past Demonstration Projects
1.

CMS Projects

HHS has conducted numerous demonstration projects related to
Medicare. The ACA gives HHS broad authority to create demonstration projects that test various ideas for decreasing costs or improving
care delivery in federal health-care programs.247 While some demonstration project recommendations are outlined in the legislation,248
HHS also has general authority to develop or demonstrate improved
methods for the investigation and prosecution of fraud in federal
health-care programs.249 Some carried out by CMS in the past include
(1) a value-based purchasing initiative designed to tie Medicare payments to performance on quality and efficiency, (2) the Hospital Quality Incentive Demonstration, (3) the Physician Group Practice Demonstration to improve care of patients with chronic illnesses or requiring preventive care, and (4) the Medicare Care Management Performance Demonstration.250
CMS is currently involved in two demonstration projects with implications for fraud and abuse regulations.251 These projects concern
“gainsharing” between hospitals and physicians. Gainsharing programs involve hospitals paying physicians a share of the savings that
result from collaborative efforts between the hospital and the physician to improve quality and efficiency in care delivery.252 Gainshar247

Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111–148, §
3021(a), 124 Stat. 119, 389 (2010) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1315(a)) (creating
the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Innovation).
248
§ 6409(a), 124 Stat. at 390-92 (recommending twenty project models,
including the promotion of broad payment and practice reform in primary care, and
provision of payment to providers for using patient decision-support tools that improve individual understanding of medical treatment options).
249
42 U.S.C. § 1395b-1(a)(1)(J) (2006).
250
Master Demonstration, Evaluation, and Research Studies for ORDI System
of
Record
09-70-0591:
List
of
Projects,
CMS.GOV,
5-8,
http://www.cms.gov/DemoProjectsEvalRpts/downloads/MasterSORList.pdf
(last
visited Nov. 8, 2011).
251
DRA 5007 Medicare Hospital Gainsharing Demonstration, CMS.GOV
(2006),
https://www.cms.gov/demoprojectsevalrpts/md/itemdetail.asp?itemid=CMS1186805;
MMA Section 646 Physician Hospital Collaboration Demonstration, CMS.GOV
(2006),
https://www.cms.gov/demoprojectsevalrpts/md/itemdetail.asp?itemid=CMS1186653.
252
DRA 5007 Medicare Hospital Gainsharing Demonstration, CMS.GOV, 1,
http://www.cms.gov/DemoProjectsEvalRpts/downloads/DRA5007_Solicitation.pdf
(last visited Nov. 8, 2011).
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ing implicates two specific fraud and abuse statutes: (1) the civil
monetary penalty law, which prohibits a hospital from knowingly
making a payment, directly or indirectly, to a physician as an inducement to reduce or limit items or services furnished to Medicare or
Medicaid beneficiaries;253 and (2) the Anti-Kickback Statute if one
purpose of the cost-savings payment is to influence referrals of federal
health-care program business by the physicians.254
The New Jersey Hospital Association initially proposed a gainsharing demonstration project in 2004, but at that time, CMS did not
have the statutory authority to waive gainsharing restrictions.255 The
Deficit Reduction Act and amendments to the Social Security Act
subsequently gave CMS the necessary authority.256 CMS’s two gainsharing demonstrations included various restrictions to protect the
Medicare program, such as a requirement that payments to physicians
could not be payments for referrals that would violate the AntiKickback Statute.257
CMS has not yet released results of the project that ended in 2009,
but Jonathan Blum, director of CMS’s Center for Medicare Management and acting director of the Center for Health Plan Choices, stated
in 2009, “[w]hat we learn from the various Medicare demonstrations
help [sic] to achieve the Administration’s goals of paying for high
quality and efficient health care in America . . . . Building on these
findings, we will aggressively test new demonstration concepts to
continue to meet these goals.”258
2.

OIG Pilot Project on Self-Disclosure

The OIG has already applied the demonstration program concept in
the area of provider self-disclosure. In 1995, OIG launched a program
called “Operation Restore Trust” (ORT) to respond to a surge of
253

42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7a(b)(1).
Id. § 1320a-7b(b)(2).
255
Cinda Becker, Pilot Crashes, MODERN HEALTHCARE (Apr. 19, 2004),
http://www.modernhealthcare.com/article/20040419/NEWS/404190321/.
256
42 U.S.C. § 1395ww (2011); Medicare Program: Solicitation for Proposals
to Participate in the Medicare Hospital Gainsharing Demonstration Program Under
Section 5007 of the Deficit Reduction Act, 71 Fed. Reg. 54,664, 54,664 (Sept. 18,
2006); 42 U.S.C. § 1395cc-3 (2011).
257
DRA 5007 Medicare Hospital Gainsharing Demonstration, supra note
252, at 4, 6.
258
Medicare Says Demonstration Projects Proving Paying For Quality
Health
Care
Pays
Off,
SENIOR
JOURNAL
(Aug.
26,
2009),
http://seniorjournal.com/NEWS/Medicare/2009/20090826MedicareSaysDemonstration.htm (quoting Jonathan Blum, Director of CMS Center
for Medicare Management and Acting Director for Center for Health Plan Choices).
254
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fraud, waste, and abuse in the Medicare and Medicaid programs.259
One of the initiatives included in ORT was a two-year pilot of a voluntary self-disclosure program, targeting home health and nursing
facility suppliers and providers in five states. Together, the five states
accounted for 40 percent of Medicare and Medicaid beneficiaries.260
The program was based on an approach taken by the Department of
Defense starting in 1986 for self-disclosed incidents of fraud by defense contractors.261
The OIG’s main purpose in developing the program was to increase industry participation in the detection and prevention of Medicare and Medicaid fraud and abuse. From the OIG’s perspective, the
program offered providers a way to decrease potential costs from governmental audits and investigations and avoid possible exclusion from
Medicare and Medicaid. In addition, the program offered insight into
industry patterns and practices.262 The OIG learned from the program,
and then used that knowledge to refine its approach before releasing
its current self-disclosure protocol nationwide in 1998.263
C.

Proposed Provisions of a Stark Self-Disclosure
Demonstration Project

Just as CMS is currently using demonstration projects to learn
about various parts of the health-care industry, and just as the OIG
piloted a novel approach to self-disclosure several years ago, so CMS
should now use the opportunity afforded by the ACA to experiment
with ways to make the SRDP more effective. CMS should specifically include the following in a new Stark self-disclosure demonstration project: (1) a two-track process, (2) a flat penalty for procedural
violations, and (3) an explicit statement of tangible benefits in the
SRDP.

259
OFF. OF INSPECTOR GEN., DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERV.,
OPERATION RESTORE TRUST ACTIVITIES 1 (Nov. 1995) [hereinafter OPERATION
RESTORE TRUST], http://oig.hhs.gov/oei/reports/oei-12-96-00020.pdf.
260
Id.
261
See generally DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE VOLUNTARY DISCLOSURE
PROGRAM, supra note 109, at 1.
262
OPERATION RESTORE TRUST, supra note 259, at 34.
263
OIG’s Provider Self-Disclosure Protocol, supra note 108, at 58,399-400
(establishing that OIG’s current protocol eliminated a number of provisions found in
the pilot program, including: pre-disclosure requirements and preliminary qualifying
characteristics, disclosures limited to particular health-care industries, and automatic
preclusion of providers from disclosure if already subject to a government inquiry).
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Two-Track Process

Prior to the release of the current SRDP, the AHA suggested a
two-track system for disclosures that offers an excellent framework
for a demonstration project. Under the AHA proposal, Track I would
allow for expedited reviews, similar to “desk audits” at many agencies.264 This type of review would facilitate disclosure of situations
that can be resolved on the basis of evidence provided by the disclosing party. The agency would verify the data provided, but would not
conduct a full-scale investigation.265 The AHA offered missing signatures, mistaken payments, mistaken non-collection of payment, and
holdover leases as examples of matters that could be handled on an
expedited basis.266 Track II would be for more complex matters that
need a detailed review by CMS. The AHA identified arrangements
with “complex payment methodologies” or situations where “the extent to which the self-referral law applies is unclear” as good candidates for Track II review.267 The AHA emphasized that CMS should
be flexible in administering the two tiers and that “[t]he SRDP should
not attempt to define the circumstances or categories of arrangements
for which the protocol is available. To do so would limit its utility
and the ability of the agency to appropriately address complex situations that must be evaluated on a case-by-case basis.”268
CMS did not publicly explain why it rejected the AHA’s twotrack proposal. However, CMS’s response to public comments on the
2008 proposed rulemaking may provide a clue. CMS rejected a proposal to allow parties who inadvertently failed to conform to a procedural requirement the opportunity to “self-correct,” or, in other words,
fix the problem going forward and not disclose the problem. CMS
stated that it did not believe that this proposal met the “no risk of program or patient abuse” standard.269
264
A desk audit, or review, is conducted by an agency based on correspondence or phone interviews with the subject of the review rather than an on-site visit
by the agency. For example, CMS Medicare contractors conduct desk reviews of
health-care provider cost reports to determine whether the report can be settled without completion of a full audit. CMS, MEDICARE FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT MANUAL,
ch. 8 § 20, available at https://www.cms.gov/manuals/downloads/fin106c08.pdf (last
reviewed June 12, 2009).
265
AHA Letter, supra note 8, at 2.
266
Id.
267
Id. at 3.
268
Id.
269
Alternative Method for Compliance with Signature Requirements in Certain Exceptions, 73 Fed. Reg. 48,434, 48,707 (Aug. 19, 2008) (codified at 42 C.F.R. §
411.353(g)).
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A demonstration project could incorporate the AHA two-track
framework while still addressing CMS’s concern. For simple matters,
such as missing signatures or non-collection of payment, CMS could
require providers to disclose the violation, but only require a desk
audit rather than a full investigation. If any facts came to light during
the desk audit that caused CMS to be concerned that the provider had
not fully disclosed all the issues, CMS could move the matter to Track
II and conduct a full investigation. For most simple matters, neither
CMS nor providers would have to worry about a time-consuming and
expensive investigation. This process would address provider concerns raised in the AHLA survey on OIG disclosures that many of the
disclosures resulted in investigations that dragged on for many months
or even years.270
2.

Flat Penalty for Procedural Violations

In situations where the government does not allege any intent to
steer referrals to a provider, CMS should exercise its discretion to
sever the link entirely between Stark violations and the value of socalled “tainted” referrals.271 If the service in question was necessary
and provided properly, neither the government nor any patient has
been harmed. The dollar value of the service should be irrelevant to
the penalty calculation. Furthermore, the conduct to be punished
should be the failure to document the arrangement. Whether the physician billed millions of dollars or only a few dollars to the Medicare
program should be irrelevant to the penalty assessed for the conduct.272
Four prominent health-care attorneys whose practices include a
significant amount of Stark work273 have used this notion as the basis
270

Voluntary Disclosure Survey, supra note 153, §11 (follow “View 65 Responses” hyperlink to Responses 27 and 58 for Question 11 which state: “very slow
process” and “[t]ook a long, long, long time”).
271
See A Proposal for Resolving Technical Stark Violations, AM. HEALTH
LAWYERS
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1,
http://www.healthlawyers.org/Events/Programs/Materials/Documents/AM10/holden_
proposal.pdf (last visited Nov. 8, 2011).
272
Id. at 2.
273
The authors are Robert Homchick, Sanford Teplitzsky, Beth Schermer and
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a past member of the American Health Lawyers Board of Directors. Robert G. (Bob)
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DAVIS,
WRIGHT,
TREMAINE
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for a proposal they made in 2010 to CMS prior to its release of the
SRDP.274 In their proposal (Homchick Proposal), the attorneys suggested that CMS establish a flat $5,000 penalty for procedural Stark
violations. They lobbied CMS and discussed the idea with other
health-care attorneys in an attempt to create popular support for it.
The Homchick Proposal stated that:
[t]he category of arrangements that would qualify for
summary disposition should include arrangements in
which (1) the compensation is [at fair market value]
and does not vary with referrals; (2) the failure to fit
within an exception is due to the lack of an adequate
[written agreement]; (3) the entity can prove by parole
evidence that the compensation for the arrangement
was set in advance; and (4) the failure to have a sufficient [written agreement] was inadvertent (i.e.[,] the
failure was attributable to negligence [rather than] a
knowing violation of the Stark requirements).275
They suggested that the penalty be assessed per arrangement, and
commented that, “in our experience, noncompliant arrangements
rarely occur in isolation.”276 This proposal addressed the same type of
violations as the AHA two-track proposal, but went further than the
AHA proposal in suggesting the notion of a flat penalty. It also expressly limited the availability of a desk audit to procedural violations,
something the AHA resisted doing.
In support of their proposal, the attorneys argued that it
would allow CMS to focus enforcement resources in areas
where Stark law violations present real concern and damage
to the Medicare program. The proposal would encourage
self-disclosure, create a pathway for the fair and equitable
Schermer is a partner with Christofolo Schermer LLC. Beth Schermer, CHRISTOFOLO
SCHERMER LLC, http://www.christofoloschermer.com/schermer.html (last visited Jan.
11, 2012). Mr. Teplitzky and Ms. Schermer are both past presidents of the American
Health Lawyers Association and recipients of its David Greenberg award for service.
Id.; Sanford Teplitzky, supra. Craig Holden is President of Ober Kaler and a former
trial attorney with the Health and Human Services Office of the Inspector General. S.
Craig Holden, OBER KALER, http://www.ober.com/attorneys/s-holden (last visited
Jan. 11, 2012).
274
Robert Homchick, Proposed Stark Technical Violation Fix, AM. HEALTH
LAWYERS ASS’N (May 3, 2010, 11:06 AM) (on file with author).
275
A Proposal for Resolving Technical Stark Violations, supra note 271, at 2.
276
Id.
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resolution of the hundreds, if not thousands, of technical violations in the provider community and avoid the waste of enforcement resources on these technical violations.277
The AHA also suggested a penalty scheme similar to that suggested by the Homchick Proposal. The AHA proposed stipulated
damages “for categories of violations posing the least risk of harm to
the program or its beneficiaries” in amounts ranging up to $10,000.278
The AHA cited agreements with missing signatures or situations
where an arrangement was otherwise compliant with an exception but
had not been documented in the manner specified in the regulations,
as examples of situations where the stipulated penalties would apply.
The AHA suggested that this provision should be applicable regardless of whether the situation qualified for expedited review or not under its two-track proposal.279
CMS did not comment publicly on either the AHA/Homchick
proposal or the general idea of a procedural/substantive distinction.
Some high-profile cases have offered CMS and the DOJ the opportunity to incorporate that distinction into their rationale for the penalty
calculation. For example, the DOJ settled with Detroit Medical Center (DMC) for $30 million in a case involving a mixture of procedural
and substantive issues.280 Rather than categorize the unsigned leases
that were not below fair market value separately from the other
agreements that arguably were, the DOJ press release lumped all of
the infractions together, stating simply that “improper financial relationships between health care providers and their referral sources can
corrupt a physician’s judgment about the patient’s true healthcare
needs.”281 Also, if the DOJ settlement amount reflected any discount
on the penalties in recognition of DMC’s voluntary disclosure, the
press release made no mention of it. This lack of a distinction leaves
providers with no confidence that inadvertent errors will be treated
more leniently than intentional attempts to defraud the government. A
demonstration project offers the opportunity to make the important
distinction between intentional actions and innocent errors.
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Explicit Statements Offering Tangible Benefits for Self-Disclosure

The simplest improvement CMS could make to the SRDP is to
make the kinds of statements about the SRDP that the OIG and New
York OMIG have made about their protocols. Whether the differences between the CMS, OIG, and New York OMIG protocols truly
signal a different approach or are merely an oversight, they have certainly been interpreted by the provider community as significant.282
The contrast between the agencies is especially striking in light of the
fact that the OIG protocol deals with potential criminal liability under
the Anti-Kickback statute while CMS deals with a civil statute. CMS
could add clarity and consistency to the government’s handling of
health-care providers’ self-disclosures by simply stating their willingness to settle a claim for less than the face value of the penalties.
CMS should also expand the list of mitigating factors that it will
consider to include some of those suggested by the AHA:
•

•
•
•
•

D.

whether the parties’ failure to meet all of the prescribed criteria in an applicable exception was due
to an inadvertent error or an intentional act,
whether corrective action was taken by the parties,
whether the services provided were reasonable and
medically necessary,
whether the care was sought in an emergency
situation, and
whether the Medicare program or any beneficiaries suffered any harm from the provider’s actions.283
Measuring the Results of a Demonstration Project

As part of each of its previous demonstration projects, CMS developed criteria for determining the success of the project. The CMS
staff is best positioned to determine specific measures that would be
most helpful in evaluating any project. CMS should, at a minimum,
consider the amount of money recovered during the demonstration
period, along with the number of providers participating, as compared
to SRDP results to date. CMS should choose states for the project
282

See Conn, supra note 219, at 25 (analogizing provider navigation between
multiple disclosure protocols with ancient Greek sailors navigating between two
mythological sea monsters, Scylla and Charybdis, poised to devour sailors).
283
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224

HEALTH MATRIX

[Vol. 22:169]

that include a variety of demographics, including hospitals in rural,
urban, and suburban settings. Just as CMS consulted with trade
groups, providers’ counsel, and others in the development of previous
demonstration projects,284 it should include similar stakeholders when
developing this project. In fact, the ACA mandates that CMS consult
with such groups in the development of any demonstration project.285
Since the AHA and the AHLA, among many other groups and individuals, have been very active to date on self-disclosure issues, it is
likely that those groups would be willing to assist in the development
of a good demonstration project model.
CONCLUSION
CMS’s approach to provider self-disclosure of failure to comply
with the Stark Law appears to be based on an assumption by the government that providers will disclose merely because the law says they
must. However, providers do consider the advantages and disadvantages of compliance with laws. In the case of Stark self-disclosure,
there are few advantages for providers, and a great many significant
disadvantages. The CMS self-disclosure protocol punishes healthcare providers heavily who disclose even very minor violations of the
Stark Law. It also fails to distinguish between simple procedural failings and more significant noncompliance. Furthermore, use of the
SRDP invites virtually unlimited government scrutiny, a dangerous
prospect at best for any provider.
CMS would do well to heed Benjamin Franklin’s advice about using honey rather than vinegar to catch flies. The self-disclosure protocol should be revised to establish a two-track system for disclosure
that distinguishes between procedural and substantive violations of the
Stark Law and a flat penalty for procedural violations. The government does not have the resources to police how every dollar of the
enormous Medicare program budget is spent. Therefore, it should do
everything possible to encourage health-care providers to police themselves. Self-disclosure of minor procedural violations of the Stark law
would improve recovery of federal program dollars, encourage provider integrity, and avoid unnecessary expenditures for enforcement.
284
See Press Release, NJ Hospital Ass’n, Medicare Picks NJ to Test Innovative
Incentive
System
(Aug.
18,
2009),
available
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3021(a), 124 Stat. 119, 389 (2010) (to be codified 42 U.S.C. 1315(a)(3)).
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A revised self-disclosure protocol offers the opportunity for providers
to become partners with the government in assuring program integrity,
at least with respect to the large number of minor violations of the
Stark law. This change would enable regulators to focus their limited
resources on investigating and prosecuting providers who seek to intentionally defraud government health-care programs.
The ACA’s emphasis on using demonstration projects to test new
ideas for improving the federal health-care programs offers CMS an
opportunity to establish a demonstration project to test these reforms.
The demonstration project model would limit potential dangers to
program integrity. It would also enable government officials to learn
a great deal about common Stark issues that providers encounter. If
the demonstration project reveals issues that should be investigated,
the government would then be in a better position to do so.
The fact that fewer than one hundred providers have taken advantage of the Stark self-disclosure protocol shows that vinegar is not
attracting providers’ disclosures. It is time for CMS to try a little
honey in the controlled environment of a demonstration project. If the
disclosure project proves out Ben Franklin’s aphorism as predicted
here, taxpayers and health-care providers alike will benefit.

